That video was simply awesome. I don't think I've laughed so much before. Fab light-heartedness brought to a serious thread,

PRS stands for Peer Rating System.

 

AFAIK, AF doesn't have such a system. A few years ago, they considered something somehow similar but did not implement it. The thinking was (is ?) - as far as I can tell - that such a system was unnecessary because simulator checks, line checks and pilot reputation (even in a large company) give enough information on who needs advise or special attention. Also, due to past and recent history, the French in general - not to mention unions - are very leery about reporting about someone else's behaviour.

 

Personnaly (and please note I am NOT a professional pilot) I was surprised to learn that such a system existed in at least one company and would really like to know if it exists in many other countries/companies. As I mentioned above, I think it runs agains latin (not only French) mentality but of course, I could be wrong.

 

The AF crew didn't follow their own procedures, their own training, their own airmanship.

 

This sounds right to me. Maybe the Airbus and/or AF procedures also need a close review but again, that sounds right.

 

Bruno

The problem with the more 'official' rating systems as opposed to ones with the ability to anonomously comment on matters, is that people are often leery about telling the truth via more official routes if they think it will result in either a hard time or any embarrassment when they are identifiable with the comment. This can lead to a lot of resentment and ultimately does not help to solve problems.

 

I'm very wary of that possibility in my job (I train people on computer software); after each course I do, each delegate gets a 'post course evaluation sheet', where they can fill out various things, put comments and score me on various aspects, but I think people can be reticent about putting bad comments whilst I am still there, so I always point out to them that they are free to take the evaluation sheet with them and fill it out later and send it in (even without their name on it if they like), or, log onto the training company's website and express any opinions there if they prefer. I think that gives people the opportunity to be genuinely truthful in their opinions, and that's important, because if there is something I could improve upon, I want to know about it. Such evaluations are important in my job, because the company insists that if you start getting more than a few adverse comments, or low marks, then you will get canned. Fortunately I invariably get very favourable comments, but I would certainly want to know if anyone was unhappy.

 

The need for such anonomous systems started to become apparent in the 1970s, which was a bit before the importance of CRM training was prevalent at airlines. One famous incident which occurred at BEA (known as 'the Dublin incident' among BEA crews) highlighted issues surrounding the need for better CRM and the need for a suitable means for crews to express concerns about fellow crew members. In the Dublin incident, a BEA Captain named Hagyard complained to the Crew Controller that the two pilots he was rostered with were not suitable for the flight because he could not have his preferred choice for P2 in the right seat owing to the fact that the other crew member was not qualified for the P3 slot. He was told that he had to fly with whom he was rostered and that led to an argument between Hagyard and one of his crew where he apparently yelled at the man and said that he would be useless in an emergency, and this unsettled the young pilot, who then made a mistake with the flaps whilst they were en-route to Dublin, which is where the incident got its name. This might seem an innocent enough affair, since the flap error did not result in anything serious on that flight, but it was to have more tragic repercussions...

 

Needless to say, the story went around BEA like wildfire. Three days after the incident en route to Dublin, another argument brewed up in the crew room at Heathrow, initially triggered by the difference between senior and junior pilots, since many of the junior pilots were then advocating strike action, which many of the senior pilots were against. During the argument Captain Stanley Key, brought the subject of competence up again and suggested that his subordinates could not be trusted, but it is also thought that the argument may have triggered a heart condition with Stanley Key. Key was not popular among young FOs, in fact many BEA Tridents had graffiti in their cockpits specifically about Stanley Key. Shortly after the argument, Key and his crew took off from Heathrow in BEA Trident G-ARPI, but the aircraft stalled upon climbout and crashed into a field. During the AAIB investigations, it was postulated that Key's overbearing nature, and the possibility that he may have been ill too, could possibly have contributed to a fatal crash which was caused by the Trident's Droop Flaps being retracted well below the recommended flying speed of 225 knots, although in fairness to Key, this could not be absolutely proved to be the case. Nevertheless, the droops retraction at low speed did indeed cause a stall and the Trident subsequently crashed into a field at Staines in Surrey, killing 118 people.

 

Because of the CRM issues relating to the accident, the crash led to the demand for cockpit voice recorders to be installed as part of the FDR fitment on airliners, since at the time there was only limited data stored by FDRs. The crash is also regularly cited as an example of what poor CRM can lead to and was certainly one of the catalysts for its arrival at most airlines, and the issue of grievances among various pilots also led to a number of suggestions in regard to the ability to anonomysly report concerns about the abilities of flight crews.

 

You can watch more about how this relates to the incident here:

 

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Al

I have to say I agree with Alan here on this one. I cannot imagine an operation without PRS, even now as one of the senior Captains at EIN I'm still put off from correcting people [and for the record; senior != old fart!!!], both captains more senior than me as well as those my junior. I have no qualms with personally correcting a F/O, though there's something of a taboo about correcting a fellow captain, particularly about the small things such as the above example of saying err and urm too much in their anouncments, I mean obviously I'd have no problem telling them "Hey listen, I like the landing gear to be down and locked by 10' above the runway by the way", important things like that I can say to anyones face, but giving small tips on someone's style is hard when they've 20+ years under their belt, so an anonymous systems like PRS are a great way to sort that out.

 

And it's not just the pointing things out, but for me too, to see what I do that both annoys people and that makes them uncomfortable. That keeping the windows open thing above is a personal flaw of mine and has appeared on my PRS a few times, but these aren't things that you like to mention to peoples face. These things we post and rate on PRS don't necessarily have to be safety related, it just gives us little hints at what we could improve on, without that bad taste in our mouths the next time we meet the person.

 

At least that's how I see it, if I'm not told about it, I'll never know, and some people just don't like nagging about things like leaving windows open....

 

[We use both the Dublin Incident and the Stains crash above as part of our CRM training, for the record.]

 

Capt. Rónán O Cadhain.

Here in the states, after you get past your probationary period you are protected by the union. The only way something will happen is if you continuously do the wrong thing or you actually create a big hazard. Otherwise we just ride up the seniority rollercoaster.

Forget that. It was not remotely the "cause" of the accident. Loss of IAS happens more often than you think. It is followed by a standard recovery. The AF crew didn't follow their own procedures, their own training, their own airmanship. The crew were complacent to the impending and developing situation from the Capt downwards.

vololiberista

 

Sorry, I was being slightly facetious with that remark in that if you want to point the finger at one single thing then you have quite a large choice, each with their own persuasive set of arguments.

 

I think we're splitting hairs here anyway - I don't disagree that the crew messed up initially massively and then got themselves into a state of confusion that they never recovered from. My point has always been that simply concluding pilot error and then closing the book misses a huge amount of smaller issues that contributed to the crash (whether that be training, crew attitude, design of the Airbus flight computer and the manner in which it informs pilots of danger, spatial disorientation, instrument feedback in emergencies, CRM, approach to bad weather etc) which leaves the door wide open for it to happen again.

Here in the states, after you get past your probationary period you are protected by the union. The only way something will happen is if you continuously do the wrong thing or you actually create a big hazard. Otherwise we just ride up the seniority rollercoaster.

 

Okay listen to set the record straight here:

• PRS is not related to seniority, Seniority is purely based on length of service to the airline.
  
• PRS is not designed to get you fired, it is there as a method of seeing what you need to improve on.
  
• We still have a union at EIN.
  
• PRS is designed as an anonymous way of telling someone they need more practice in certain areas.
  
• PRS gives you an insight into how others feel while working with you.
  

PRS is not unique to EIN, I'm sure many American airlines have adopted it too. To walk around with this attitude that once you have passed your probationary period you no longer need to practice things is a dangerous one. PRS IMO is an amazing way to improve safety at an airline, and if AF didn't have it, they should certainly consider implementing a PRS ASAP.

 

 

Sorry, I was being slightly facetious with that remark in that if you want to point the finger at one single thing then you have quite a large choice, each with their own persuasive set of arguments.

 

But that's the thing with this crash, it really was the one thing that sunk them; It's fine, though not advised to fly through a storm. It's fine, though a pain, to operate the aircraft in alternate law. It's managable to fly the aircraft w/o ASI using pitch and power. What is never acceptable is pulling back on your side stick in a stall, EVER....

 

Rónán O Cadhain.

Yup, we keep on coming back to this one with AF447, and like most real world flyers on here, I just don't get it at all: 'brrr, brrr, brrr, STALL' - hmmm, guess that's the signal to hold the stick back on the stops and try for that docking maneuver with the International Space Station. I mean, seriously, what the hell was all that about?! It just defies everything you learn on day one right after 'here's the door handle for the cockpit', it is even the basis of an old pilot joke: 'to make the plane go down, push forward, to make the plane go up, pull back, and to make the plane go down much faster, pull back hard.'

 

So unless Air France can come out with a plausible explanation for it, or they announce a massive change in their pilot training programme, I'm never getting on an AF jet as long as I live, because I don't want to be in the back of an airliner knowing that everyone on board who has seen any airliner disaster movie is probably a better pilot than the guys up at the pointy end.

 

Al

Al, whats the name for the action when you pull back on the stick subconsciously while focusing on the roll? I really should know the term but it has escaped my mind. I've seen new guy's on the A3xx do it all the time in the sim during the flight control check.

 

I still strongly beleive the initial nose up response was due to the PF being focused on the sensitive roll in direct law.

 

Regards

Just thinking out loud here as I'm not 100% sure on every fact of the case, but if the AOA was increased past 30 degrees, they would have been in Abnormal attitude law and not actually alternate law? Correct? Though this really doesn't matter as it's effectively alternate law anyways....

 

Though regardless, he should have been focusing on the stall over leveling the wings, though I do understand the tendency to pull back in a turn, it doesn't clear him from not pushing forward on the stick, or at least not pulling back...

 

Rónán.

Hey Ronan,

 

My reference was in regards to the initial pitch up or 'zoom climb' as some put it, After the A/P disconnected. That seems to be what initially got them in the mess.

 

From what I remember Abnormal law may have saved them if it occured early enough since autotrim would have been disabled. The criteria is 50 degree pitch or 125 degrees bank. 30 AOA is also a criteria, I guess 30 degree's alone is not enough to switch laws.

 

Regards

Hey Ronan,

 

My reference was in regards to the initial pitch up or 'zoom climb as some put it' After the A/P disconnected. That seems to be what initially got them in the mess.

 

From what I remember Abnormal law may have saved them if it occured early enough since autotrim would have been disabled. The criteria is 50 degree pitch or 125 degrees bank. 30 AOA is also criteria.

 

Regards

 

Agreed it was what got them into the mess, but a mess that should have been easily gotten out of.

 

And off the top of my head, Abnormal Attitude law is caused by:

 

AOA > 30 degrees or >-10 degrees

Bank angle > 125 degrees

Pitch attitude > 50 degrees nose up or > 30 degrees nose down

Speed > 440 kts or < 60 kts

Mach > M0.96 or < M0.1

 

Rónán.

It would be interesting to know what data was rejected that prevented the aircraft from switching to abnormal law. without autotrim the outcome may have been different.

It's clear that this was not a case in which Bonin pulled the stick back without realizing it while focusing on roll. When he started pulling it back he told David that he was going to slow down (apparently because of the increase in slipstream noise). Toward the end, he said he had had the stick all the way back practically the whole time. So he certainly knew he was doing this.

Quote:

 

Take a look at the info below, there was no reason for the PF to apply a nose up command after they switched to Alt2* he seems to be only worried about keeping the wings level, it doesnt seem intentional.

 

2 h 10 min 05 Altitude=35024

The P/A2 disengages.

The roll angle from 0 to 8.4 ° in 2 seconds while the handle is in neutral.

The pitch is 0 degrees.

Cavalry charge (Alarm: disconnection autopilot)

2 h 10 min 06

The flight control law passes from normal to alternate. PF: "I have control"

During the period 2 h 10 min 07-2 h 10 min 18

The SS is positioned:

- To pitch between neutral and ¾ stop

- Left half and then stop right half-stop, 2 times, alternating left until it stops then right to the half-stop (period 4 seconds).

The pitch increases to 11 °.

The vertical acceleration varies between 0.9 g and 1.6 g.

The roll angle is between 11 ° right and 6 left.

The vertical velocity increases up to 5200 ft / min.