May 10, 201214 yr these new technelogical advances, about the latest and greatest kit that was in these aircraft, but do you know what I saw? Two Wings What an absolutely brilliant riveting post, Rónán. Rick Almeida
May 10, 201214 yr Ronan, I'm curios about your take on spatial disorientation playing a factor in the crews decisions. Are you familiar with the A320 gulf air flight 072 crash in Bahrain? They performed a missed approach in pitch black, after selecting TOGA the captain applied full nose down sidestick despite the GPWS going off he held it there until they hit the ocean. I knew some of the crew onboard and it took me a while to get my head round why the captain would do that and why the F/O never said a word. Well, clearly I was not familiar with the case, however after reading the wiki page on it it does seem curious and worth further investigation. Getting disorientated is one thing, but disobeying a direct command from the EGPWS is something else and begs the question as to the attitudes of the crew and how they trusted their aircraft. I mean, for example, I've often gotten a EGPWS warning when flying into EICK, due to the fact that it is perched on the side of a steep hill, of course I know this and forge onward to land, so perhaps they thought they knew what they were at but in fact did not. As regards the FO saying nothing I'm unsure. You'd know this better than I, but what is the culture like in Bahrain with regards challenging your superior? Were they expats or locals, or both? I'll have to review that further. *Trust your instruments* Back to basics again, but I digress... Rónán. Rónán O Cadhain.
May 10, 201214 yr In sim drills and training, we were always told, in a stall, power up, pitch down. Hi Rónán, According the first BEA interim report, the memory items from the Airbus QRH for unreliable speed indication valid at the time of the accident stated : A- If the safe conduct of the flight is impacted : - AP/FD .............................................................................................OFF - A/THR .............................................................................................OFF - PITCH/THRUST : * below THRUST RED ALT ..............................................................15°/TOGA * above THRUST RED ALT and below FL 100.................................10°/CLB * above THRUST RED ALT and above FL 100.................................5°/CLB ...//... B- When at, or above MSA or Circuit Altitude : Level off for troubleshooting Any comment on this please? Thanks in advance, Bruno PS : Of course the full Air France abnormal procedure for this scenario (annex 9 to the report) is 8 pages long and clearly states "respect (ie <take into account>) the stall alarm" so my question is maybe not easy to address. PPS (edit) : Having said that, your point that "in a stall, power up and pitch down" is of course valid but the problem is that, however incredible this may sound, the crew apparently failed to recognize that the plane was stalled ! How do you get out of a situation that you don't understand? That seems to be the most heart breaking aspect of this tragedy.
May 10, 201214 yr If my memory serves me right, that BBC documentary did make a reference as to why they flew into that storm. I cannot quite remember it all, but it seems that they had no option or there were other storms that particular night north of Noronha but chose the lesser of two evils. I'll need to dig up that BBC recording. I do not know if others will agree, but what this thread has done to this Forum, is reveal discussions and inputs from men/women with so much cogent thoughts being put down for us mere mortals, to read. A sheer joy to read the R/L inputs, compared to some of the other fictional trite in other threads such was what variants, or what routes some want even before the T7 has seen daylight. Rick Almeida
May 10, 201214 yr Thank you Ronan, a lot of people seem to think that if an Airbus crashed is because the design of it failed as you are not "supposed to be able to crash it with all the protections". At the end of the day, like i said before, it is just an aeroplane, governed by gravity, and must be commanded by airmanship. Will Reynolds Flight Sim Addict
May 10, 201214 yr Commercial Member Well, clearly I was not familiar with the case, however after reading the wiki page on it it does seem curious and worth further investigation. Getting disorientated is one thing, but disobeying a direct command from the EGPWS is something else and begs the question as to the attitudes of the crew and how they trusted their aircraft. I mean, for example, I've often gotten a EGPWS warning when flying into EICK, due to the fact that it is perched on the side of a steep hill, of course I know this and forge onward to land, so perhaps they thought they knew what they were at but in fact did not. As regards the FO saying nothing I'm unsure. You'd know this better than I, but what is the culture like in Bahrain with regards challenging your superior? Were they expats or locals, or both? I'll have to review that further. *Trust your instruments* Back to basics again, but I digress... Rónán. Unfortunately there is still a culture amongst the locals regarding how the captains treat the junior f/o's, on the plus side things have changed a lot. I do have to be careful with what I say since my names in my signature. It still amazes me that they both remained silent with full forward sidestick and pull up sounding on the gpws. The report states that the increase in acceleration from TOGA in complete darkness caused them to believe the aircraft was pitching up. As you say 'trust your instruments' the mind is incredibly powerful, just makes me think what it must feel like for real in that situation when you're truly not expecting it. Kind regards Rob Prest
May 10, 201214 yr Hi Rónán, According the first BEA interim report, the memory items from the Airbus QRH for unreliable speed indication valid at the time of the accident stated : A- If the safe conduct of the flight is impacted : - AP/FD .............................................................................................OFF - A/THR .............................................................................................OFF - PITCH/THRUST : * below THRUST RED ALT ..............................................................15°/TOGA * above THRUST RED ALT and below FL 100.................................10°/CLB * above THRUST RED ALT and above FL 100.................................5°/CLB ...//... B- When at, or above MSA or Circuit Altitude : Level off for troubleshooting Any comment on this please? Thanks in advance, Bruno PS : Of course the full Air France abnormal procedure for this scenario (annex 9 to the report) is 8 pages long and clearly states "respect (ie <take into account>) the stall alarm" so my question is maybe not easy to address. Well, what I was referring to in the above quote was the procedure in a stall, what you've posted is the procedure for unreliable airspeed. Get out of the stall first, then follow unreliable airspeed procedures second. That's the way to do it. I'm sorry I don't really know what you want me to comment on here, that looks the exact same as the procedure in my QRH.... Unfortunately there is still a culture amongst the locals regarding how the captains treat the junior f/o's, on the plus side things have changed a lot. I do have to be careful with what I say since my names in my signature. It still amazes me that they both remained silent with full forward sidestick and pull up sounding on the gpws. The report states that the increase in acceleration from TOGA in complete darkness caused them to believe the aircraft was pitching up. As you say 'trust your instruments' the mind is incredibly powerful, just makes me think what it must feel like for real in that situation when you're truly not expecting it. Kind regards No bother about not posting things in the open, totally understand. Interesting exercise to try some time is to get your desk chair [if it swivels], sit on it in a silent room and spin around as fast as possible with your eyes firmly shut. When you come to rest try and guess the direction you are facing. The results can be very eye opening and really enforce the trust your instuments saying.. Rónán. Rónán O Cadhain.
May 10, 201214 yr Nothing at all to add here other than to thank Rónán for his thoughts - cheers! Hope that was the kind of contribution you were looking for. Enjoy. Ró. Rónán O Cadhain.
May 11, 201214 yr Well, what I was referring to in the above quote was the procedure in a stall, what you've posted is the procedure for unreliable airspeed. Get out of the stall first, then follow unreliable airspeed procedures second. That's the way to do it. I'm sorry I don't really know what you want me to comment on here, that looks the exact same as the procedure in my QRH.... Hi Rónán, That was precisely the point I was trying to make. The crew - apparently - never recognized they were in a stall and therefore never applied a stall recovery procedure. I must admit, however, that my initial post was not very clear and that I had to edit it a couple of times before I managed to express my idea clearly. The last time probably while you were answering. Sorry about that. Your other points are well taken and I am not personnaly qualified to challenge them. However I, like many others, have noted different opinions expressed by a few A320/A330 captains I've met. Especially regarding how the sight of a conventional yoke pulled all the way back could have helped the captain to quickly acquire situation awareness when he entered the cockpit after having missed the beginning of the sequence. For the record, other opinions have been expressed time and again about whether or not he should have taken control but, here again, I am not personnaly qualified to comment. Best regards and thanks very much for you input. Bruno
May 11, 201214 yr The crew did not follow the "IAS Douteuse" proceedure when air speed indications were first lost. As already stated this required flying by power and pitch. That's an emergency manoeuvre - The content and task-sharing of which must be known from memory by all flight deck crew. The stall warning sounding continuously for some 54 sec. the crew took took the aircraft well outside its known flight envelope (based on wind tunnel and flight tests data) within about 3 sec of the start of the warning and eventually to 30 deg plus AoA holding full nose-up elevator. During the subsequent manoeuvre AoA never fell below 35 deg. After that, it must be questionable if the aircraft could ever have been got back into its known flight envelope whatever the crew did. Gerry Howard
May 11, 201214 yr Hope that was the kind of contribution you were looking for. Enjoy. Ró. Indeed it was. I have a question though - do you think that the implementation of when the stall warning sounded contributed to the accident? In that some of the evidence points to the PF reacting to the stall warning sound restarting when the pitch was decreased (which doesn't appear to make much sense) and stopping when it was increased. Or is this a case of knowing your aircraft and knowing when the stall warning will stop sounding due to invalid parameters, even though the aircraft could still be stalling?
May 11, 201214 yr For the record, other opinions have been expressed time and again about whether or not he should have taken control but, here again, I am not personnaly qualified to comment. But that's just the thing, he should have taken control, but you do NOT need to have a sidestick in you hands to take control of a situation. You use your authority, and make clear, concise DEMANDS. "Push Forward, Apply Toga". It's not difficult, you do not ask if they are doing this, you do not need to check. You hear the stall warning, you demand, "Push Forward, apply TOGA".... I have a question though - do you think that the implementation of when the stall warning sounded contributed to the accident? Are you questioning whether the stall warning should be designed differently? I don't really know what you're getting at here, could you re-phrase please.... On a seperate note, one thing that I would be interested in seeing is the pilots PRS ratings, it would shed some light on them and their attitudes and abilities, though I doubt information like that would ever be released into public domain. Rónán. Rónán O Cadhain.
May 11, 201214 yr would be interested in seeing is the pilots PRS ratings, Release of this would be a hot potato with consequences, both for Air France and the French Government that bankrolls AF, I reckon. Rick Almeida
May 11, 201214 yr Release of this would be a hot potato with consequences, both for Air France and the French Government that bankrolls AF, I reckon. That depends really on how high or not their PRS ratings were, it could swing the argument in a whole new way. Though of course the fundamental principal of the system is that it remains anonymous. And you would wonder if given that the crew are no longer around would it be wise to publish some comments that could not be defended nor backed up.... It could open a whole can of worms or put this debate to bed, or both... Rónán. Rónán O Cadhain.
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