I think that this simulator is a very good procedural simulator, but as others have pointed out is the lack of motion.  I have flown in a level d simulator and there is a big difference.  I have spent several hours in them for taxi and run training.  The motion, level of detail, accuracy, etc are hard to beat.  I have also had several times that I have flown in the jump set for check flights.   I work all day on the Airbus and Boeing aircraft and having done operational checks, there still is a lot of things that are missing from the computer simulator.  Just remember how much a computer simulator and a certified Level D simulator costs.  With that said I get a lot of bang for my buck, with PMDG aircraft.

 

Jared Shipley 

No way I could handfly a airliner.   Could I setup a autoland? yeah I think so.  So if I inherited a completely stable 737 on autopilot I think I could be talked through it. 

 

I remember my introductory flight in a piper archer and I thought I have been flying FS for years this little piper will be a piece of cake.  

 

 

LOL was I wrong,  EVERYTHING felt weird and foreign, I understand how the controls work but now I can FEEL the plane, it took be a bit just to get used to the feeling of flight.  My next lesson I did a lot better and felt a lot more in control. 

These threads pop up from time to time and I'm always entertained the responses.

 

Similar to the tune of my last video, I find it funny that people think that aviation - from realm to realm - is wholly different.  Flying a Cessna 172 is not too wholly different from flying a C207, a Piper Malibu, or a DC3.  To fly them well, sure, they have differences that must be mastered, but if the main goal is "land the plane and save people," it shouldn't be too difficult.  Pull back, trees get smaller; push forward, trees get bigger; throttle forward, go faster; throttle back, go slower.  Those concepts are still the same, regardless of the plane.

 

Of course, people are going to stop there and probably flame me for reducing everything way too far to its base, but the concept is true: approach situations from their similarities so that the differences are manageable.

 

Sure, the very first time I flew a Piper Malibu, I noticed that it felt a lot heavier, flew a little faster, and had much more power than the 172 I usually flew (not to mention the retractable landing gear and constant speed prop), but I still felt at home.  The owner actually asked me to fly from HEF to CHO, shoot an approach, and fly back to HEF all on my own.  He had just had two new Garmin units installed and wanted to play with them and make sure the installation was correct himself, in VFR conditions, without having to worry about looking outside before taking the plane on a flight in IMC and realizing later that something was wrong when he needed the units.  So, I flew (the first time I'd ever even touched a Malibu, mind you) from HEF to CHO and back, while he played and minded his own business.  Granted, I had someone beside me to take over in case anything were to happen, but it was definitely a situation of relying on past experience to guide you through a new one.

 

Here's where it gets tough, though:

There are people who I would trust nearly immediately to pick up a new skill (relevant to aviation here), and execute it nearly flawlessly.  Meanwhile, there are also people who I wouldn't trust, even at 1500+ hours.  There are also a bunch in between, where, I think they could do it, but I'd prefer to sit next to them and look over their shoulder.  Having been an instructor, I've seen people pick things up immediately and carry on like a pro, and I've also seen them struggle with a concept, even though they were aces at similar in a different setting.

 

For some, the difference in environment, speed, weight/inertia, and so on would be a lot to handle.  Add ATC and "distress" to that situation (this thread never defined if it was crew incapacitation, or that plus something else) and that person would be easily over their limit.  To others who thrive off of stress, and pick things up easily, it would just be another fun (albeit stressful) challenge.  The former might not be able to do it, while the latter probably could.

 

Again, the issue is pretty broad and ranges from can't, to could possibly get it on the ground, to could possibly use the plane again, to you'd have no idea it was just a simmer up there.  I'm sure this thread has someone who fits in each one of those categories.  For anyone who's even flown a real plane before, they have a big leg up, but flying a real plane isn't everything.

 

 

 

I'll end with this:

A low time Cessna driver (cited more often in stories as "passenger" because he hadn't flown in 18 years) landed a King Air after his pilot friend had a heart attack.  I'd argue that flying a King Air single pilot is a lot more task-intensive than flying the 777 (much less automation), but he was able to pull it off even with being out of the saddle longer than some of the people here have been alive.  A plane is still a plane.  I can guarantee that most people wouldn't pull it off with the quality of someone flying that plane for thousands of hours, but I'd bet a decent amount could still pull it off.  Then again, if you were to add too much "non-normal" into the situation, you start drastically cutting back on the survival rate.

Well said. I think in ideal conditions I could probably make a survivable landing with a modern day airliner, but then if there were some serious system failures / bad weather the chances would definitely go down quite a bit. 

 

After all from simming I know how most important modern Airbus / Boeing systems work, while sim surely lacks the actual feel of flying I don't think even hand flying a real thing would be like rocket science or anything... 

I'm sure they would not be in the cockpit if their employers doubted their ability to handle any and all situations and had tested them beforehand in a controlled environment.

 

The testing VLJ510 spoke of is limited to a few failure cases such as engine failure at V1, engine fire, etc..

 

AF447 for example, was a gross failure of basic airmanship, crew coordination, decision making, and a failure to understand the operational modes of the FBW, not to mention a total lack of understanding of weather RADAR that got them into a worse situation from a bad one to begin with.

 

Heindsight being 20/20, these discussions are largely academic. Human Factors has been studied for decades, and continues to be so, but so far there hasn't been a major break-through that would reduce the number of accidents/incidents. As it is, human error still accounts for > 50% of all accidents/incidents. Rarely does a purely mechanical failure lead to the loss of an airframe today.

 

Something that is rather scary are many incidents of "cockpit blackout" on Airbus aircraft. In the two cases I'm aware of, both times the flight crew opted to continue the flight to the destination (some 2-3 hours flight time) rather than return to the departure airfield. In one of the cases, they flew the aircraft in the emergency electrical configuration. No thanks!!!!

 

Best regards,

Robin.

 

 

I agree somewhat a plane is a plane.  but I still would not want to try and handfly a real 737..  On a level d sure I would like that. 

 

My point about a pure sim pilot landing a real plane is if they never felt the motion and feel of real flight I think they may quickly be overwhelmed.   

 

Maybe I am different but my first flight I spent more time just getting used to the feeling and the OMFG this is real not a sim and my "flying" suffered.   If my instructor became incapacitated on climb out I like to think the situation would have focused me and I would be able to apply what I learned in FS but who knows and I am glad it never came up.    

 

After that  I was fine, second lesson onward and my instructor was impressed with how I handled the plane. 

I agree somewhat a plane is a plane.  but I still would not want to try and handfly a real 737..  On a level d sure I would like that. 

 

My point about a pure sim pilot landing a real plane is if they never felt the motion and feel of real flight I think they may quickly be overwhelmed.   

 

Maybe I am different but my first flight I spent more time just getting used to the feeling and the OMFG this is real not a sim and my "flying" suffered.   If my instructor became incapacitated on climb out I like to think the situation would have focused me and I would be able to apply what I learned in FS but who knows and I am glad it never came up.    

 

After that  I was fine, second lesson onward and my instructor was impressed with how I handled the plane. 

 

I understand your angle.  I don't fully agree with it, but I understand it.  Your experience definitely fits into one of my categories.  My first lesson had a good bit of sensory overload for the first few minutes, but the instructor also had me land the plane on my first lesson, so getting over that sensory overload wasn't an issue for me after those first few minutes.

I agree somewhat a plane is a plane.  but I still would not want to try and handfly a real 737..  On a level d sure I would like that. 

 

My point about a pure sim pilot landing a real plane is if they never felt the motion and feel of real flight I think they may quickly be overwhelmed.   

 

Maybe I am different but my first flight I spent more time just getting used to the feeling and the OMFG this is real not a sim and my "flying" suffered.   If my instructor became incapacitated on climb out I like to think the situation would have focused me and I would be able to apply what I learned in FS but who knows and I am glad it never came up.    

 

After that  I was fine, second lesson onward and my instructor was impressed with how I handled the plane. 

 

It's flying at a faster airspeed but the basic aerodynamics are 100% the same - a plane really is a plane. A Cessna pilot isn't going to understand the technology layers present on a 737, but he/she will certainly understand the visceral "stick and rudder" act of flying the airplane. It's exactly the same as the small GA aircraft.

Concerning Asiana T7 KSFO accident:

 

 

consider this, the instructor on the flight had 12,387 hours of flying experience of which 3,220 was on the 777. He had done hundreds of visual approaches and passed multiple sim checks. The rest of the crew on board had equally impressive heavy jet experience.

 

I am willing to bet if we could roll back the clock and ask any of the flight crew 'Do you think you could allow the airspeed to bleed down to 93kts?' I am pretty sure we all know what the answer would be

 

 

 

I absolutely agree to that. I wonder very often why pilots are being blamed for crashing a plane that was equipped with a lot of automation (here: e.g. low airspeed protection), while actually being betrayed by the lack of its presence when needed/expected.

So the habit of crash investigation's final reports of finding a suitable "goofy-pilot"-theory very often gets intentious...

 

Concerning AF447 A330 accident:

 

AF447 for example, was a gross failure of basic airmanship, crew coordination, decision making, and a failure to understand the operational modes of the FBW, not to mention a total lack of understanding of weather RADAR that got them into a worse situation from a bad one to begin with.

 

 

I absolutely disagree to that. This is IMO a typical case of enforced "goofy-pilots"-theory, which unfortunately everyone believes blindly.

The crew, especially the PF, is blamed for causing the crash solely. This is simply ridiculous: 

The WX forecast failed (FL350 temp deviation) and the crew was aware of the problem but surprised by its impact. The ITCZ conditions were extremly hazardous (icing caused not "only" tripple probe failure; most likely also thrust and lift reduction, added weight and reduced stabalizer efficiency), the A/C performance became critical (EAI+WAI at FL350), the A/P and law logic became confused (autotrim still active below VLS, direct law not triggered), the unreliable speed training program is/was a "light" version, extended abnormal attitudes/aerodynamic upsets recovery procedure training is/was regarded as needless as FBW and protection laws would prevent such situations...

What annoys me e.g. very much is the investigation reports' statement, that the PF pulled the stick out of many possible but unclear reasons. The instructor handbook for crew trainers states that it is a natural reaction to pull the stick in a threatening situation. Further: at the border of flight envelope the stick input reactions should be instinctive/immediate and direct on aircraft response (pitch rate at low speed)... but: autotrim is ment to be deactivated when IAS below VLS (minimum selectable speed, e.g. 125kts) but (although all speeds were unreliable or "0") the stabalizer was constantly trimmed until fully UP... and: in alternate law (1 and 2) pitch inputs are still converted to load factors while the stall protection (flight envelope) gets lost (but a stall warning is triggered therefore). Load factor conversion in conjunction with autotrim without speed information is NOT a pilot's fault, it is a system failure.

In addition: direct law is ment to be triggerd e.g. when "three failures" occur. Aren't three probe freezes already three failures? Direct law makes elevator deflection proportional to stick deflection AND would have shown a large "use manual trim" message on the PFD which could have caused the pilots to take a look at the trim wheel position...

 

So saying

"AF447 for example, was a gross failure of basic airmanship, crew coordination, decision making, and a failure to understand the operational modes of the FBW, not to mention a total lack of understanding of weather RADAR that got them into a worse situation from a bad one to begin with."

makes me really angry...

 

Automation welfare misbelief, the thought that "perfect machines" are dominant to "imperfect humans", is a typical early technology phenomenon, which in the 21st century should be a thing of the past actually.

A proper reaction of the computerized surrounding would have been: "o.k. I see, we have a problem, we are about to crash and I have no idea what to do. "You have control" or in this case "direct law" would have been the right solution.

 

BTW, interesting correlation between the AF447 accident and the loss of MH370: the AF447 crash investigation report recommends triggering the ELT already when an "emergency" situation occurs. If this proposal would have been implemented sooner, MH370 could have been found quite early.

 

Greetings,

Claus

Hi Claus,  Just a little info -  The aircraft will only go to direct law once the gear is lowered (So it behaved correctly)

 

So yes, ALT2B and the auto trim in pitch helped make the situation worse (still it was only following orders!)

 

If they did have direct law the outcome could have been very different! Most people (including Airbus) became surprised at how stable the aircraft was in such a strange situation.

 

If the machine  had rolled over or pitched up to an extreme angle 'Abnormal law' would have kicked in and disabled Autotrim.   Instead it smoothly pitched onto it's tail and dropped like a leaf.

 

Cheers

 

 

• July 6 – Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a Boeing 777, crashes short of the runway on landing at San Francisco International Airport, killing three of 307 on board and injuring 182. The crash was the first fatal accident involving the Boeing 777.

 

The crashed killed two and the Fire Department killed one.

Myth Busters did it, sorta. 

 

http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/mythbusters/mythbusters-database/person-with-no-flying-experience.htm

 

Most people (including Airbus) became surprised at how stable the aircraft was in such a strange situation

 

 

 

 

Instead it smoothly pitched onto it's tail and dropped like a leaf.

 

 

Hi Rob,

 

I appreciate your view. Also from my side it is not about making a good aircraft look like a dangerous machine. My concern is more about the way pilots being presented as imperfect humas who were not able to operate their perfect flying machines in distressed situations...

 

The concept/idea is:

"STABLE PLATFORM and AUTOTRIMMED"

and

"Don’t fight with the stick; if you feel you overcontrol, release the stick."

 

This works as long as autotrim does not trim out flight stick's nose up inputs while in an unreliable speed AND stall situation. The resulting fully UP THS can even NOT be overcome by a full down elevator deflection. Also in direct law manual DN re-trimming of the THS to a "more neutral" position would have been mandatory, otherwise nothing would have changed...

 

For everybody interested in having a view on details:

The official investigation site of BEA offers among others the following PDFs:

 

The actual report:

Here for example page 103 (“UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED" FCOM procedure reprint) shows that the PF's likely attempt to keep the pitch up to 15 deg with "thrust levers" in TOGA was according to the learned INITIAL procedure. The problem is that after that initial procedure thrust and pitch should have been reduced (e.g. +3.5 deg, 90% N1), as soon as e.g. a stabilized flight path (wings leveled, maintaining altitude) is established. As the A/C was at/over its limits due to high temp dev at FL350 + WAI+EAI, ITCZ severe icing (probes and structure) and turbulence, TOGA and aimed 15 deg pitch (A340=12.5 deg) never led to a stabilized flight path. On the contrary: IMO this caused the plane to slow down into a stall with the THS in the fully UP position...

 

The graphs of parameters:

Here for example page 3 is showing the very even curves of altitude and stabilizer (at full UP already at approx. 27.000 ft), while most other controls, surfaces and air data parameters are excessively changing their values. IMO this shows the possible disadvantage of the "stable and autotrimmed platform" concept...

 

I can also very much recommend the "complete" CVR transcript:

Here at least the part from 1 h 37 min 03 cpt: "It’s snowing" (at FL350) until 2 h 08 min 36 pf: "ah (....) you did something to the A/C"(?) pnf:  "I didn’t touch it"(!) is very much worth re-reading. It is documenting extreme WX conditions, the (blamed) PF's high awareness, the CPT's level of respect for the weather front and the more relaxed or senior attitude of the PNF until his diversion proposal and the disconnection of the A/P.

 

And the A330 Instructor Handbook (available via search engines) is a good source of finding the corresponding  matters explained from another perspective...

 

Greetings,

Claus

Here for example page 103 (“UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED" FCOM procedure reprint) shows that the PF's likely attempt to keep the pitch up to 15 deg with "thrust levers" in TOGA was according to the learned INITIAL procedure. The problem is that after that initial procedure thrust and pitch should have been reduced (e.g. +3.5 deg, 90% N1), as soon as e.g. a stabilized flight path (wings leveled, maintaining altitude) is established. As the A/C was at/over its limits due to high temp dev at FL350 + WAI+EAI, ITCZ severe icing (probes and structure) and turbulence, TOGA and aimed 15 deg pitch (A340=12.5 deg) never led to a stabilized flight path. On the contrary: IMO this caused the plane to slow down into a stall with the THS in the fully UP position

 

Hi Claus

 

As much as I have tried to defend the flight crew (Too much to go into on this topic) We cannot deny that the PF made a very fatal mistake if he was attempting that UAS Procedure.  

 

The UAS  procedure described is 'Not' for cruise altitude, it is for below the thrust reduction altitude. Who in their right mind would try TOGA and 15 deg nose up in cruise and think it is a safe action?

 

TOGA & 15deg pitch is for a loss of airspeed indication on take off!  

 

I personally don't believe he was attempting the UAS procedure.  No one will ever know what he was really thinking. 

 

In ALt2B Roll becomes Direct (Very twitchy) Pitch remains in alternate.  I strongly believe his pitching up was 'initially' a by-product of trying to remain wings level. You can test this on a simple joystick at home.

 

Below is the UAS procedure for the A330.

 

 They should have followed - Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL 100......5° / CLB

 

Even if he put his hands on his lap the outcome would have been better.

 

 

 

 

 

AP/FD.......................................................... ................... OFF

A/THR......................................................... .................... OFF

PITCH/THRUST:

Below THRUST RED ALT...............................................15° / TOGA

Above THRUST RED ALT and Below FL 100......................................................... ....10° / CLB

Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL 100......................................................... ......5° / CLB

FLAPS (if CONF 0(1)(2)(3))...................... MAINTAIN CURRENT CONF

FLAPS (if CONF FULL)....................... SELECT CONF 3 AND MAINTAIN

SPEEDBRAKES................................................. ..CHECK RETRACTED

L/G........................................................... ........... UP

TOGA & 15deg pitch is for a loss of airspeed indication on take off!

 

Hi Rob,

 

thanks for correcting my misinterpretation of the "TOGA & 15 deg pitch" rule which is obviously and for sure not ment during CRZ: mea culpa!

But propably that confusion was also part of the PF's reaction: the pitch was at first 10 to 15 deg and later between 10 and 20 deg up with the thrust levers in TOGA for the longest periods of time.

What the PF was "really thinking" very likely no one will ever know, but they were trying desperately to keep the A/C in the air without success.

I also agree to the point that they did not perform excellent.

At 2h13m40 the PNF says  "Climb climb climb climb"  and the PF answers "But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while". For a while here means that for the last 40 seconds he tried different nose up pitches while gradually increasing the overall pitch up value. The 30 seconds before that he equally tried nose down and nose up pitches while being in TOGA all the time...

What remains sure IMO is that the A/C in no way responded as the crew expected it and that also other certain design features (e.g. missing AoA display, (dual) stick inputs not physically noticeable) did not help to find a solution out of the distressed situation.

 

I am also sure that people involved changed many things to make this never happen again.

 

Greetings,

Claus

It is strange tho, the aircraft did actually warn them of dual inputs (Flashing red warning on the glareshield & a aural warning)  They seemed to ignore it  I guess with all the confusion it is not surprising.  

 

Anyway, interesting conversation! Been a while since I have thought about AF447

 

Cheers