fsx-ms If I manage to master high-end add-on planes, would I be able to fly them in real world?

[skelsey 765]

 

 

They forgot their basic training and totally ignored the stall warning.

 

Well -- in their defence, one of the problems was that the stall warning stopped when the airspeed was (detected to be) below 60kias. This resulted in the situation where pitching down caused the stall warner to activate as the speed increased past 60kias. This is, obviously, a confusing situation: you make an input which causes the stall warner to activate. The instinct, in that case, most likely be to reverse that input: this caused the stall warner to stop, because the speed once again dropped below 60kias and the warning was inhibited.

[BlueStar 323]

 

 

When I say partial panel most of these same people think reversion mode, just hit a switch and select the secondary ADC or AHRS.

 

I learned to fly in the military.  Part of our instrument training included doing spins on partial panel (RMI and Altimeter only) and having to roll out of the spin on a predetermined heading.

 

Don't get me wrong, I am old school, but I love automation and how it makes my life easier and safer.  :smile: 

 

blaustern

[vololiberista 205]

Well -- in their defence, one of the problems was that the stall warning stopped when the airspeed was (detected to be) below 60kias. This resulted in the situation where pitching down caused the stall warner to activate as the speed increased past 60kias. This is, obviously, a confusing situation: you make an input which causes the stall warner to activate. The instinct, in that case, most likely be to reverse that input: this caused the stall warner to stop, because the speed once again dropped below 60kias and the warning was inhibited.

The problem is that recovery from a stall is instinctive. At least it should be. Basic training doesn't mean "simple" training it means fundamental training that must be instinctive. If you hear a stall warning do you a. Pull the stick back or b. push it forwards

[blackopscc1 14]

I go back to the post earlier @bluestar made: the PF found himself unexpectedly in a situation where the a/c was out of trim, and the automation had kicked off. Most likely, the PF got behind the aircraft and never managed to recover it. Like @bluestar said of my post earlier, a good example albeit more dire situation, to support the statement that it is doubtful any "fs pilot" could step into the cockpit and recover a misbehaving or out-of-trim aircraft.

 

Interestingly, I've spoken to several 330F pilots I've met, one of whom pointed me to a video made (I think) by Flight Global after the FDR and CVR from AF447 were recovered. The video demonstrated quite well that, when presented with a similar situation (and without prior knowledge of what they were being asked to demonstrate), the CX pilots (in the sim) reacted without hesitation and based on their training (and experience) recovered the aircraft with only minimal effort. Basically, when they observed that the Airbus was in alternate law, they quickly applied pitch and power inputs (if I recall right, something like 5 degrees @ 85%), and then worked the problem with the automation until recovered.

 

JT

[Holdit 551]

 

 

You don't get to complain about sweeping assumptions when you link everyone to a video "children of the magenta line"

 

Please explain how either the link to the video or the video's content constitutes a sweeping assumption.

 

 

 

That talking point is used to insult younger pilots as being inexperienced at "'real flying" and only knowing computers. 

 

I suggest you try actually watching the clip.

 

 

 

Basic stick and rudder knowledge without knowing the systems is why they crashed in the first place.

 

Not according to the air accident investigators.

[skelsey 765]

If you hear a stall warning do you a. Pull the stick back or b. push it forwards

 

Yes, but here's the problem:

 

They pushed the stick forward, and the stall warning sounded.

 

They pulled the stick back, and the stall warning stopped.

 

To put your post another way: you make a control input (in any direction) and the stall warner sounds. Do you a: continue holding/increasing that control input, ignoring the stall warner, or b: reverse the control input which results in the stall warner being silenced?

 

I am not for a moment suggesting that there were not sufficient cues for the crew to recognise the situation, but it is really important to recognise that this was not a completely cut and dried situation: it was the middle of the night, IMC in the ITCZ and when the crew did what their training said was the right thing (push the stick forward) a completely counter-intuitive thing happened: the stall warner started going off.

 

If you don't recognise that you are stalled (which they should have) and the stall warner is not sounded, but then you apply a control input and the stall warner goes off, you are going to start getting seriously confused.

 

I suggest you try actually watching the clip.

 

I understand the point that 777200lrf was making, and I have some sympathy. The problem is not the content of the presentation, which makes many salient points. It is the fact that many misunderstand the point and simply wheel it out in response to almost every incident or accident with the implication that all that is needed to eliminate every aircraft accident in the modern era is to simply disconnect all the automatics and all the problems will go away. That is absolutely not what Vanderburgh was saying, and it is certainly not borne out by the accident statistics vs the era when 'real men hand flew'.

 

Yes, hand-flying proficiency is important. Yes, the automatics should be viewed as a tool to aid the crew in what they want to do and to relieve their workload. But it is a much more complex issue than just saying "don't need none of this fancy computer nonsense".

 

(Edit for ridiculous typo).

Edited October 6, 2016 by skelsey

[Holdit 551]

 That is absolutely not what Vanderburgh was saying, and it is certainly not borne out by the accident statistics vs the era when 'real men hand flew'.

 

Yes, hand-flying proficiency is important. Yes, the automatics should be viewed as a tool to aid the crew in what they want to do and to relieve their workload. But it is a much more complex issue than just saying "don't need none of this fancy computer nonsense".

 

Absolutely right, but if I wasn't saying that, and Vanderburgh wasn't saying that, why respond as if either of us did?

 

It's a wonderful example of the straw man fallacy in action...

[computerflyer 6]

"If you don't recognise that you are stalled (which they should have) and the stall warner is not sounded, but then you apply a control input and the stall warner goes off, you are going to start getting seriously confused."

 

Agree.  If I got a stall warning when I applied forward control input, I'd probably start to wonder if I was flying inverted.

[skelsey 765]

 

 

Absolutely right, but if I wasn't saying that, and Vanderburgh wasn't saying that, why respond as if either of us did?

 

It wasn't so much what you did or didn't say (and if I offended then I apologise), but more the fact that the presentation has over the years become a sort of shorthand for the sort of sentiments 777200lrf has pointed out, which I recognise and have some sympathy with. As I say, it is not how Vanderburgh intended it, but it is how people have used it over the years: Vanderburgh may have used the term "Children of the Magenta" in an affectionate manner, but I think it is fair to say that people do not use it in that way in modern parlance! Likewise people who link the presentation in discussions about accidents or incidents often do so to imply that unless you have taken a particular career path (i.e.: flown a fast jet/in the bush/insert whatever pre-1980s airliner you fancy) you're not a 'real' pilot -- just a 'child of the magenta'.

[Holdit 551]

It wasn't so much what you did or didn't say (and if I offended then I apologise), but more the fact that the presentation has over the years become a sort of shorthand for the sort of sentiments 777200lrf has pointed out, which I recognise and have some sympathy with. As I say, it is not how Vanderburgh intended it, but it is how people have used it over the years: Vanderburgh may have used the term "Children of the Magenta" in an affectionate manner, but I think it is fair to say that people do not use it in that way in modern parlance! Likewise people who link the presentation in discussions about accidents or incidents often do so to imply that unless you have taken a particular career path (i.e.: flown a fast jet/in the bush/insert whatever pre-1980s airliner you fancy) you're not a 'real' pilot -- just a 'child of the magenta'.

 

That's interesting and I didn't know that such a sensible presentation could have acquired such negative baggage. Nevertheless, I didn't say it, Vanderburgh didn't say it, so why should I (or he) give two hoots what idiots who choose to misrepresent him say, or have what they say shoved in my face just for referencing the original content? And yes, I know it wasn't you.

 

To take issue what what someone says is one thing...but to take issue with a hallucinatory version of what someone has said, that's just...well there are a number of words for it, none of them terribly complimentary. Let's just say that someone should cop themselves on a bit.

[KenG 492]

It is unfortunate that some are just looking for any reason to be offended. The true professionals can see this video for its worth and I have used it many times in teaching automation management and flight instructors. I guess this is what separates those who do it for a living and those who think it is a game. 

[BlueStar 323]

As I say, I am skeptical that adding an AoA gauge would have made any difference at all to where his attention was!

 

If the pilot had been trained in it's use, it would have been one of the first places the pilot would have looked. 

 

It is part of my HUD and part of my instrument scan.  It's how I was trained. :smile:

 

blaustern

[skelsey 765]

 

 

That's interesting and I didn't know that such a sensible presentation could have acquired such negative baggage. Nevertheless, I didn't say it, Vanderburgh didn't say it, so why should I (or he) give two hoots what idiots who choose to misrepresent him say, or have what they say shoved in my face just for referencing the original content?

 

Absolutely (and actually, I feel we may be in vigorous agreement). As I say, the presentation itself is excellent and contains many very worthwhile learning points; but I do somewhat roll my eyes when I see it posted (or some snide comment about 'children of the magenta') in response to virtually every incident (to be fair, more often on forums supposedly populated by professional pilots, than here) involving a modern airliner as an argument against automation.

 

It is a great (and very important) presentation, but it is not the answer to all of aviation's ills and it is a bit sad that the iconic 'children of the magenta' line has become somewhat synonymous with everything negative about automation.

 

 

 

If the pilot had been trained in it's use, it would have been one of the first places the pilot would have looked. 
 
It is part of my HUD and part of my instrument scan.  It's how we are trained.  

 

Sure, but if there's anything that's clear from AF447 it's that there was very little instrument scan going on that night. One of the best (albeit now a little dated) textbooks on flying I've read is Birch and Bramson's Advanced Manual of Flying Training -- in the section on instrument flight, the point is made that a proper instrument scan (and proficiency in instrument flying) is all about being able to read the panel as a whole, rather than reading individual instruments, rather like the way in which one reads an entire word or sentence rather than individual letters or words. If the AF447 pilots had had a good instrument scan and were reading the panel as a whole, then I suspect we would not now be discussing an accident.

 

To take the point further, pilots are also trained to recognise the symptoms of a stall: high pitch attitude, low and reducing airspeed and a high rate of descent, especially coupled with full back stick. All of those cues were there, (and even if you disregard the airspeed which was considered unreliable, you would think that the pitch attitude, rate of descent and full back stick would have got their attention). If the crew couldn't identify the stall from those cues, I'm still not convinced that an AoA indicator would have grabbed their attention away from the FD bars any more than the other very powerful cues did.

 

However, we will never know for certain.

[N400QW 205]

Couple of things appear to be certain in AF447 accident. Both pilots got behind, in critical phase, and time ran out. Fatal results.

[vololiberista 205]

Couple of things appear to be certain in AF447 accident. Both pilots got behind, in critical phase, and time ran out. Fatal results.

Actually all three pilots including the Captain. It is clear that no one was monitoring the instruments correctly at all before or after the Captain came onto the flight deck. As has been said the all the cues for a full on stall were "more" than apparent. Also the procedure for loss of airspeed indication is part of basic training. Basic meaning fundamental. They didn't apply that procedure. If they had no one would have noticed that there had been a problem.

I am holding the stick back as hard as I can and the aircraft is dropping out of the sky faster than a lead brick. Ok so  a stall recovery might be a good idea. The problem with AF447 is that they were so deeply into the stall and falling out of the sky so fast that it would have taken pretty much all the airspace underneath them to recover had they eventually identified it.