Safe to say it was not THAT foggy on the morning in question... ;-)

For those interested there is some good commentary on this incident, and potential implications, over at Ben Sandiland's blog http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/

 

I think the critical question will be how Australian domestic carriers treat their fueling policies. No forecast fog and otherwise fantastic weather, no need for an alternate - right?!?

 

Oz dispatchers enter here ...

 

Cheers James

I think the critical question will be how Australian domestic carriers treat their fueling policies. No forecast fog and otherwise fantastic weather, no need for an alternate - right?!?

I have no doubt the blame game will place responsibility fairly on the shoulders of the domestic carriers...what about some State or Federal funding to actually provide a measure of low visibility landing capability at this state capital airport?

 

- I know - it will never happen - just like any sensible joined up integrated transport plan will never leave the drawing board - 'she'll be right' - right?

 

 

I'm getting really tired of this idea that ILS = autoland, anywhere, any time.

 

I've spoken with many pilots over the years and most of them have said that it is actually quite rare to do a full CATIII autoland. Most of them said it happened only a few times in years worth of flying tubeliners. 

I've spoken with many pilots over the years and most of them have said that it is actually quite rare to do a full CATIII autoland. Most of them said it happened only a few times in years worth of flying tubeliners.

It's cultural. In the US, it's done more as a matter of last resort. I've done more autolands simply to keep the jet current than I have for actual weather conditions.

 

At the Asian carrier I flew for, it was much more common to do autolands. (I actually had a Captain tell me, "If the ceiling is less than 1000', Autoland.")

 

I'm sure Europe and the rest of the world have their own views.

I've spoken with many pilots over the years and most of them have said that it is actually quite rare to do a full CATIII autoland. Most of them said it happened only a few times in years worth of flying tubeliners. 

Have a look at the video of LIMC I posted further up. Milan is famous for its fog. Remember the rwy incursion accident at Linate? In the video the only way the pilots get to see where they're going at all is due to the Korean Jumbo ahead of them!

RNAV (GNSS) Rwy 27 Approach - better visibility obviously.  Can someone please explain the section of the approach chart below (from Navigraph - hope I'm not infringing any forum rules here) for the uninitiated and possibly also the NGX procedures for this approach.  I think I'm right saying that Radio Altimeter mins are 493 feet (660 above sea level) but I don't really understand the rest.   I set Nav Radio 1 to 113.7 and was pretty pleased with my landing.  Auto breaks max and flaps 40.  She really slowed down in a hurry!

 

 

I think I'm right saying that Radio Altimeter mins are 493 feet (660 above sea level) but I don't really understand the rest.

 

Those minimums are correct. The number in brackets is always the AGL(Radio Height) which is the MDH. The number before that is always the ASL minimums MDA. I believe the number below the Mins info is the minimum visibility to conduct the approach.

 

The side view of the approach and the table below it is where you see the vertical profile of what heights you should be at where. From that we can see that you should be a 2000' unitl 5.7nm from the threshold(THR) of RWY27. Next, as you cross the Final Approach Fix (MIAEF as indicated by the cross symbol) you should be at 1880' After descending on the 3 degree glide-path, you should be at the MDA 1.4nm from the THR of 27. Next to the diagram you also have the missed approach information, which in this case is to climb to fix MIAEH and 2000' the as required.

 

Adjacent to the table of altitudes, you see the RWY diagram, which shows Landing distance available (LDA), which is the length of the RWY minus any displaced thresholds etc.

 

Finally, under the mins table, you have the Rate of Descent (ROD) info. This shows the FPM you should be descending at to maintain the 3 degree glide-path on the approach, for various different aircraft speeds.

 

Another thing to consider is the VOR position in regards to the RWY THR, which could be slightly offset, giving a slightly different distance than the distances given on the chart.

 

Hope that answers your query.

I think I'm right saying that Radio Altimeter mins are 493 feet (660 above sea level) but I don't really understand the rest. 

 

You are getting fixated on the Radio Altimeter!

 

The published minima for this Non Precision Approach is 660 BARO (height in feet above mean sea level - & highlighted in BOLD) which is set against the pressure altimeter utilising the local QNH pressure setting. 

 

There is an advisory note in there clearly stating that these minima are based on forecast Terminal QNH & that if the actual aerodrome QNH is received then the minima can be reduced by 100 feet.

 

The heights (in parenthesis) are heights in feet above ground level based on the Height Above Touchdown Zone (or HAT) & are published as a reference only.

 

There are no 'Radio Altimeter mins' for this approach

 

Additionally, this approach requires a minimum visibility of 2.8km or 2800m (this is possibly where the ATSB have gotten involved in the first instance)

 

Get winding that BARO MINS knob on those EFIS Panels folks!

 

Just to back this up -

 

PMDG 737NGX FCTM 5.15 (pp191):

 

"Decision Altitude or Height - DA(H)

 

A Decision Altitude or Height is a specified altitude or height in an ILS, GLS, PAR, or some approaches using a VNAV path or IAN where a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established.

 

The "Altitude" value is typically measured by a barometric altimeter and is the determining factor for minima for Category I approaches, (e.g., ILS, GLS, or RNAV with VNAV).  The "Height" value specified in parenthesis, typically a RA height above the touchdown zone (HAT), is advisory.  The RA may not reflect actual height above terrain.

 

For most Category II and Category III fail passive approaches, the Decision Height is the controlling minima and the altitude value specified is advisory. A Decision Height is usually based on a specified radio altitude above the terrain on the final approach or touchdown zone."

Ryan and Steve, many thanks for taking the time for your explanations.  Brilliant.  I'm going to print this off and stick it on the wall next to me.

Here is a video of explanation on how to read the info of approach plates, he has also done a few on others as well eg sid and stars etc

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1kAa5FDHcE

 

 

Ryan and Steve, many thanks for taking the time for your explanations. Brilliant. I'm going to print this off and stick it on the wall next to me.

 

No problem Tom! Glad I could help.

many thanks for taking the time for your explanations.

 

Always happy to help ... sorry for the shameless plug but ... the manuals that came with the product are a veritable goldmine of useful info.

the manuals that came with the product are a veritable goldmine of useful info.

 

What?!?!?  Surely you jest, good sir!

 

...and here's where I go on a petulant rant about how pointing out the manual could also be helpful is wholly unhelpful and assert that I've read it.

Actually I have the FCOM on my iPad but what I need to do is print the lot hard copy.  I often find that getting a basic understanding of something that's quite technical helps before diving into the manuals.  I was saying the same thing to an overseas colleague recently when he asked if I had the manuals for some software we use (if you think the FCOM's complicated...LOL).  You've kind of got to understand the system to understand the manuals, and the way we do things in the real world isn't always the same as you'll find in the manual, not to mention what's not documented.  I guess that's what we call experience.