Not sure, I know  where I work anyone involved in an incident (Pilots, CC, and last engineers to work on the aircraft) are suspended with pay for a week or two until either they can confirm that they were not at fault, or till there's reasonable certainty they were not to blame. Also gives them time to gather their thoughts. If an accident is put down to a technical problem, there is always a fleet wide inspection carried out, though usually this doesn't reveal much. The schedule for this varies depending on the seriousness of the incident.

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

Makes sense to me.  Following that train of thought, I would have to say that the South Korean government is at the very least implying the plane is at fault here.  Interesting.  

A video clip of it here http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/5003178/planespotters-prayer-as-he-films-jetliners-crash.html

A lot of focus on the new guy Lee Kang-Kook and manual flight with authrothrottles on while on FLCH and Alpha-Floors etc. etc. here.  Kang-Kook was the guy undergoing training.  He is a student.  It should be expected that he gets behind the plane or engages a mode he shouldn't have.  One of the hardest things for an airline pilot is a pure visual approach with no guidance on a clear day.  Throw in a little bit of a high setup from ATC and a new pilot, and things can get fun no matter what kind of automation or plane.  My only question is where the heck was the checkairman during all this?

 

Sorry Kevin, I enjoy reading your posts on here but have to completely disagree with this post. If someone is unable to fly a visual approach in CAVOK they have no business being in command of heavy jet with 200+ souls in the back.

 

It should 'not' be expected that they get behind the aircraft or start engaging incorrect modes at such a critical stage of the flight.  Fly the Aircraft!

Does anyone have any information on the age of the two pilots on the flightdeck? And the total no. of hours the training Captain has logged?

 

I understand the training Captain has some 3.000 hours on type (B777), while the other pilot has less than 50 hours accordingly. On the other hand the PF has nearly 10.000 hours in total, including hours on the B744.

 

Any more information explaining the steep "flightdeck gradient"?

KevinAu, on 08 Jul 2013 - 06:27 AM, said:

A lot of focus on the new guy Lee Kang-Kook and manual flight with authrothrottles on while on FLCH and Alpha-Floors etc. etc. here. Kang-Kook was the guy undergoing training. He is a student. It should be expected that he gets behind the plane or engages a mode he shouldn't have. One of the hardest things for an airline pilot is a pure visual approach with no guidance on a clear day. Throw in a little bit of a high setup from ATC and a new pilot, and things can get fun no matter what kind of automation or plane. My only question is where the heck was the checkairman during all this?

When an airline captain changes to new equipment, he goes through training, takes a type check in the simulator, and he is generally NOT a "student" when he takes command of the jet even while flying it for the first time--as the captain. It's common for captains switching equipment to have little to no experience on the new plane while their FO may have many thousands of hours in type. In a culture where the FO is discouraged from speaking up, it essentially negates most of the experience present on the flight deck.

 

A pure visual approach is one of the most basic flying maneuvers. It is not one of the hardest things for any competent and proficient pilot...if it is, he needs to find another line of work.

 

With Vref at 137 KIAS (1.3 Vstall), stick shaker would activate at ~113 KIAS (1.07 Vstall). 24 knots slow and drug-in, skimming the waves with a crazy-high deck angle. Wow. Just...wow. What ever happened to cross-checking the PAPI/VASI, or cross-referencing DME and altitude when flying an approach over water? Aimpoint and airspeed control? Basic, basic stuff.

 

There'll undoubtably be a number of interesting "contributing factors" to read about when the NTSB final report is published, but once again, we have dead people and destroyed aircraft at the hands of a crew lacking basic airmanship skills--visual approaches, airspeed awareness/control, stall recoveries, CRM etc. On super long-haul acft like the B777, do the math: four pilots flying on each acft, and flying 3-4 of these long trips per month. That's 1-2 landings each per month--that's not enough to maintain proficiency, I don't care how many hours of flying time you have.

 

I wonder how many hours of additional proficiency training an airline could buy for the $300 Million price tag on a B777 plus untold $millions in lawsuit settlement costs.

 

It appears to me that these two pilots might find a place over at Colgan Air or Air France.

 

Regards

That's an odd way to do it, why do they leave the AT engaged? I'd always be against the notion of manually flying with the AT engaged, if you're going to fly the airplane, don't pick and chose which parts you'e going to control. If it was the case that the AT failed then not having practiced proper management of the speed could have been a big factor in this accident.

 

On the note of thrust control, do I understand that the T7 only has an alpha-floor equivalent in some cases? Alpha floor if installed here could have totally avoided this situation by sending the Thrust to TOGA upon the first detection of low energy 7.5 seconds prior to impact and not the 1.5 seconds prior when the pilots decided setting TOGA thrust was a good idea. Does the 787 include a proper implementation of alpha floor?

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

Hey Ró,

 

Yes standard Boeing SOP to leave the A/T in approach, I have also not come across a 777 operator that does otherwise. I will tell you something even more strange, most 777 operators (that I know off) train engine failures in the sim with TAC engaged!  And guess what, first real major engine failure on the 777 took out the TAC.

 

Only reason why I can think Boeing changed philosophy on the 777 is due to the FBW being path stable even with thrust changes, same thing with the Bus, you still get operators wanting A/THR in 99% of time.  Fortunately it sounds like your airline isn't one of them!

He may have been new on the T7, but he had in excess of 9,000 hours. He wasn't new. He was flying visually, the first, most basic, easiest method of flying. That's not an excuse. He had a second pilot there to call him out if he was doing something wrong but unfortunately this did not happen, and is likely down to the culture in Korea and the steep cockpit gradient.

 

A visual approach is the easiest things for a pilot to do, just look out the window and fly the plane. To compare it to driving a car, a instrument approach is like parking a car in a tight spot, it takes concentration, you've to monitor a number of parameters, you've to watch out for things like pedestrians and other cars, you've to work the clutch etc, a visual approach is like driving down a clear motorway, just put it in 5th, and look out the window and stay in your lane, nothing more to it.

 

Visual approaches are super simple, it's literally look and point, with the occasional glance inside at airspeed and altitude, but that's something the Pilot Monitoring should do for you in the majority. If they had become dependent on having FD guidance down to 200' AGL, then there's something very very wrong with their training and approach to flying. We as pilots are paid to be able to fly planes, not to look at them and intervene if something goes askew.

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

I'm going to have to completely disagree with that.  We as airline pilots, focus and train to perfection our CAT III, SE ILS, RNP approaches, right?  Our focus is on having no visibility out the windows until minimums.  We do great when the weather is lousy.  However, the moment you take away our needles and flight director and leave us with nothing but an airfield over there and me over here, most airline pilots will not admit to you that it actually takes more concentration to ensure a stabilized approach in that situation since you have to play the part of ATC and ILS guidance for yourself now.  That's why Jeppeson started putting range rings with recommended altitudes on the approach plates recently, so that pilots can have something with which to guide themselves to a stabilized approach on a pure visual approach.  (When I say "pure visual approach" I mean a visual approach where there is absolutely no instrument or visual glideslope indications for you)  Visual approaches are a known and identified threat to flight safety.  At least at the airlines I've been at.  As an airline pilot, you do need to respect the threats inherent in a visual approach and not dismiss it as something which anybody should be able to accomplish half asleep.

 

And having 9,000hrs doesn't really mean too much, especially at an airline that hires ab-initios.  After 9,000 hours, how much experience taking off and landing do you really think he has, compared to a 9,000 hour pilot at an airline in the U.S.?  My bet is, he got the nod while he was in school, learned to fly under their academy, then went and sat IRO for a couple of thousand hours doing nothing but babysitting an autopilot over the ocean while the captain took a nap.  Then he upgraded to first officer on the 747 and maybe got 2-3 landings a month.  So, in the long haul world, 9,000 hours does not mean a whole lot of experience in the dynamic portions of a flight.

That's an odd way to do it, why do they leave the AT engaged? I'd always be against the notion of manually flying with the AT engaged, if you're going to fly the airplane, don't pick and chose which parts you'e going to control. If it was the case that the AT failed then not having practiced proper management of the speed could have been a big factor in this accident.

 

On the note of thrust control, do I understand that the T7 only has an alpha-floor equivalent in some cases? Alpha floor if installed here could have totally avoided this situation by sending the Thrust to TOGA upon the first detection of low energy 7.5 seconds prior to impact and not the 1.5 seconds prior when the pilots decided setting TOGA thrust was a good idea. Does the 787 include a proper implementation of alpha floor?

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

 

 I agree ro..  

 

BTW if the autothrottle was engaged the PF should still have his hand on the throttles at this low alt.  Just to be sure the AT is doing what it should be doing.  

I'm going to have to completely disagree with that. We as airline pilots, focus and train to perfection our CAT III, SE ILS, RNP approaches, right? Our focus is on having no visibility out the windows until minimums. We do great when the weather is lousy. However, the moment you take away our needles and flight director and leave us with nothing but an airfield over there and me over here, most airline pilots will not admit to you that it actually takes more concentration to ensure a stabilized approach in that situation since you have to play the part of ATC and ILS guidance for yourself now. That's why Jeppeson started putting range rings with recommended altitudes on the approach plates recently, so that pilots can have something with which to guide themselves to a stabilized approach on a pure visual approach. (When I say "pure visual approach" I mean a visual approach where there is absolutely no instrument or visual glideslope indications for you) Visual approaches are a known and identified threat to flight safety. At least at the airlines I've been at. As an airline pilot, you do need to respect the threats inherent in a visual approach and not dismiss it as something which anybody should be able to accomplish half asleep.

 

And having 9,000hrs doesn't really mean too much, especially at an airline that hires ab-initios. After 9,000 hours, how much experience taking off and landing do you really think he has, compared to a 9,000 hour pilot at an airline in the U.S.? My bet is, he got the nod while he was in school, learned to fly under their academy, then went and sat IRO for a couple of thousand hours doing nothing but babysitting an autopilot over the ocean while the captain took a nap. Then he upgraded to first officer on the 747 and maybe got 2-3 landings a month. So, in the long haul world, 9,000 hours does not mean a whole lot of experience in the dynamic portions of a flight.

What exactly do you fly again? And I suppose all the other flight crews that landed safely without the use of ILS where related to Chuck Yeager?

 

You bring up a good point about fatigue & low number of landings per month however I have to say it again, if you cannot land a perfectly functioning aircraft visual in CAVOK then get a desk job.

When an airline captain changes to new equipment, he goes through training, takes a type check in the simulator, and he is generally NOT a "student" when he takes command of the jet even while flying it for the first time--as the captain. It's common for captains switching equipment to have little to no experience on the new plane while their FO may have many thousands of hours in type. In a culture where the FO is discouraged from speaking up, it essentially negates most of the experience present on the flight deck.

 

A pure visual approach is one of the most basic flying maneuvers. It is not one of the hardest things for any competent and proficient pilot...if it is, he needs to find another line of work.

 

With Vref at 137 KIAS (1.3 Vstall), stick shaker would activate at ~113 KIAS (1.07 Vstall). 24 knots slow and drug-in, skimming the waves with a crazy-high deck angle. Wow. Just...wow. What ever happened to cross-checking the PAPI/VASI, or cross-referencing DME and altitude when flying an approach over water? Aimpoint and airspeed control? Basic, basic stuff.

 

There'll undoubtably be a number of interesting "contributing factors" to read about when the NTSB final report is published, but once again, we have dead people and destroyed aircraft at the hands of a crew lacking basic airmanship skills--visual approaches, airspeed awareness/control, stall recoveries, CRM etc. On super long-haul acft like the B777, do the math: four pilots flying on each acft, and flying 3-4 of these long trips per month. That's 1-2 landings each per month--that's not enough to maintain proficiency, I don't care how many hours of flying time you have.

 

I wonder how many hours of additional proficiency training an airline could buy for the $300 Million price tag on a B777 plus untold $millions in lawsuit settlement costs.

 

It appears to me that these two pilots might find a place over at Colgan Air or Air France.

 

Regards

 

No, that is absolutely wrong.  When a new captain takes the controls for the first time of an airliner after the sim training and type ride, he does so only as a first officer.  He is not in command.  Before he actually becomes a captain, at least in the FAA world, he needs to have completed 25 hours of IOE with a checkairman on the line, in the real plane, with real passengers.  The checkairman is the actual pilot in command.  The checkairman is the captain, even though he may be sitting in the right seat playing the part of the first officer.  Throughout this 25 required hours, the new captain is most certainly considered a student.  Even then he is not done.  After the 25 hours, he takes what we call, the "Fed Ride" where he flies with checkairman and a FAA inspector in the jumpseat observing him.  Only after successful completion of all this is he/she released to scheduling's whims and fancy as an actual qualified captain.

 

Yes the visual approach is basic.  And in the past, little emphasis placed on it in training and safety because of this attitude.  That is why there have been so many incidents and accidents resulting from botched visual approaches.

 

People have uploaded the tower tapes everywhere on the internet.  But tower only shows the end of the accident.  To figure how the accident began, you need to listen to the approach tapes.  Because that is where the setup for the accident occured.

 

My pure speculative bet is that while they were descending on their base turn from up high, they were cleared for the visual.  Once cleared, the pilot clicked off the autopilot while still in FLCH with the A/T still on.  Rolled in on final, with all their attention out the front window, and completely forgetting that the A/T wasn't going to pick it back up once they got done configuring and slowing to vref.  With the high energy setup masking all this until they were very close in.  The rest is history.  One of the exact scenarios I did for stall training recently in the sim.

Kevin, are you being ironic with the high degree of flightdeck automation that erodes basic airmen skills?

What exactly do you fly again? And I suppose all the other flight crews that landed safely without the use of ILS where related to chuck Yeager?

 

You bring up a good point about fatigue & low number of landings per month however I have to say it again, if you cannot land a perfectly functioning aircraft visual in CAVOK then get a desk job.

 

I wouldn't say they were related to Chuck Yeager, although since I'm Asian, I will say a good chance of a relation to Genghis Kahn for my successes so far.  Most likely just being conscientiousness and being able to recognize and correct during the approach.

 

I fly the E190 now.

Visual approaches are a known and identified threat to flight safety.

 

This is ridiculous, almost all approaches end up with visual portion of flight.

Kevin, are you being ironic with the high degree of flightdeck automation that erodes basic airmen skills?

 

No I am not.  I fly a plane with A/T and HUD.  We use the terms "autothrottle cripple and hud cripple."  These devices are great.  They have done wonders for safety.  However, pilots also become used to using these things and end up not being able to fly well without these devices because they become so used to these devices doing things or showing things that it takes increased brain power to move the throttle hand if the A/T is off or not being able to flare properly because there is no more velocity vector to show you exactly how the plane is descending towards the runway.

I wouldn't say they were related to Chuck Yeager, although since I'm Asian, I will say a good chance of a relation to Genghis Kahn for my successes so far.  Most likely just being conscientiousness and being able to recognize and correct during the approach.

 

I fly the E190 now.

I take it your company has stable approach criteria? Sadly children of the magenta line is the world we live in.