If the FO is unable to challange the captain because he is a lower rank, and thats something that played a role in this accident then should the carriers with this kind of demenor be allowed to fly into the US?

 

If anything, they'll probably be required to hire more foreign Captains to deal with any outstanding 'cultural issues' that are deemed a threat to flight safety.

This is ridiculous, almost all approaches end up with visual portion of flight.

 

It's not the end, but the beginning of the visual that causes the accident.  Visuals are notorious for people ending up too high or too low on approach.

I take it your company has stable approach criteria? Sadly children of the magenta line is the world we live in.

 

Yes we do, and that is my point here.  Visual approaches are notorious for causing unstable approaches.  We have E190s and Airbuses here, and our training department has been recognizing the threat of being children of the magenta line.

It's not the end, but the beginning of the visual that causes the accident.  Visuals are notorious for people ending up too high or too low on approach.

Yes, that's why you push TOGA if not stabilised. Not hard and ensures you don't kill anybody

I'm going to have to completely disagree with that.  We as airline pilots, focus and train to perfection our CAT III, SE ILS, RNP approaches, right?  Our focus is on having no visibility out the windows until minimums.  We do great when the weather is lousy.  However, the moment you take away our needles and flight director and leave us with nothing but an airfield over there and me over here, most airline pilots will not admit to you that it actually takes more concentration to ensure a stabilized approach in that situation since you have to play the part of ATC and ILS guidance for yourself now.  That's why Jeppeson started putting range rings with recommended altitudes on the approach plates recently, so that pilots can have something with which to guide themselves to a stabilized approach on a pure visual approach.  (When I say "pure visual approach" I mean a visual approach where there is absolutely no instrument or visual glideslope indications for you)  Visual approaches are a known and identified threat to flight safety.  At least at the airlines I've been at.  As an airline pilot, you do need to respect the threats inherent in a visual approach and not dismiss it as something which anybody should be able to accomplish half asleep.

 

I agree we spend vast amounts of time training to perform CATIII approaches etc, but the fact of the matter is is that visual flying is the most basic, easiest method of flying, the reason we train so much precision approaches it that they're more difficult and require more skill. Visual flying is something a Student pilot with only 10-11 hours under their belt will do solo, it's not a tricky manouver. I certainly would never brief a visual approach as being threat, not in a million years. I'd often if not always when suitable include it in my brief, but never as a threat. It is te simplest, easiest form of approach, if a pilot finds it cahllenging, he needs to seriously examine what he's doing on the flightdeck. We're not talking about a visual in Innsbruck or Madiera in weather that barely qualifies as VMC or something like that, we're talking about a straight in visual approach to a 11,000' runway in CAVOK conditions. There was a PAPI available to them.

 

On the experience front, 9,000 hours long haul if he had been doing LH his whole career would roughly be 900 sectors, enough to know when you're too low on a visual approach.

 

With regards to ab-inito pilots, I had 290 hours and was plonked in the RHS of a 737CL 24 years ago, not an issue since, with the correct training, and a proper background in CRM and an appreciation of the need to practice all elements of your flying skills there's no reason ab-inito pilots are any less safe. In fact we've just taken on a group of 20 cadets onto the line in the past month and they're all flying very nicely, with no issues at all in the RHS of an A320.

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

 

Makes sense to me.  Following that train of thought, I would have to say that the South Korean government is at the very least implying the plane is at fault here.  Interesting.

 

Asians are big into 'saving face', but then again who isn't?

 

The big story in Korea today is that some TV news anchor commented that he was glad that two Chinese died and not two Koreans.  I kid you not.

 

Before you start complaining to the Korean embassy, bear in mind that this news station is considered lower than Fox News and a lot of Koreans are upset about the comments too.

Visuals are notorious for people ending up too high or too low on approach.

If that's the case you're doing something wrong, something very wrong. This notion that visual approaches challenging is baffling to me, I'm very taken aback by it.

 

Regards,

Ró.

If the PAPI lights were operational, then surely the pilots should have known that they were way too low ages before the actual touchdown? Why did they not correct for this when they still had time?

Yes, that's why you push TOGA if not stabilised. Not hard and ensures you don't kill anybody

 

You would hope.

If RW (long-haul) pilots complain about having no more than 1-2 landings a month - doesn't that make the next visual more ... demanding?

Do you remember the old debate here on AVSIM about "thrust controls airspeed vs rate of descent on approach"? Do you airline pilots think those considerations could possibly apply here?

No, that is absolutely wrong.  When a new captain takes the controls for the first time of an airliner after the sim training and type ride, he does so only as a first officer.  He is not in command.  Before he actually becomes a captain, at least in the FAA world, he needs to have completed 25 hours of IOE with a checkairman on the line, in the real plane, with real passengers.  The checkairman is the actual pilot in command.  The checkairman is the captain, even though he may be sitting in the right seat playing the part of the first officer.  Throughout this 25 required hours, the new captain is most certainly considered a student.  Even then he is not done.  After the 25 hours, he takes what we call, the "Fed Ride" where he flies with checkairman and a FAA inspector in the jumpseat observing him.  Only after successful completion of all this is he/she released to scheduling's whims and fancy as an actual qualified captain.

 

Yes the visual approach is basic.  And in the past, little emphasis placed on it in training and safety because of this attitude.  That is why there have been so many incidents and accidents resulting from botched visual approaches.

 

People have uploaded the tower tapes everywhere on the internet.  But tower only shows the end of the accident.  To figure how the accident began, you need to listen to the approach tapes.  Because that is where the setup for the accident occured.

 

My pure speculative bet is that while they were descending on their base turn from up high, they were cleared for the visual.  Once cleared, the pilot clicked off the autopilot while still in FLCH with the A/T still on.  Rolled in on final, with all their attention out the front window, and completely forgetting that the A/T wasn't going to pick it back up once they got done configuring and slowing to vref.  With the high energy setup masking all this until they were very close in.  The rest is history.  One of the exact scenarios I did for stall training recently in the sim.

Problem is, this isn't the FAA world...it's a foreign crew on an international carrier--their rules. The airline is referring to the PF as the captain, and other pilot as the FO. And even under US rules...this guy already has a whopping 43 hours in type, so he could have legally been in command even under our rules.

 

I agree that little emphasis is placed on flying basics in recurrent sim training--what precious little of it there is. Pilots flying short-haul aircraft get plenty of hands-on opportunity on the line to remain proficient. Pilots flying long-range international routes with augmented crews often do not. When I was in the 89th Airlift Wing in the USAF, we recognized that and started scheduling our VC-32 (B-757) crews to fly additional quarterly proficiency sims above and beyond the minimum required recurrent training.

 

Bottom line, though, is that if you're not proficient in basic flying skills, you don't belong on the flight deck. There's no excuse for a crew with over 20,000 hours of combined flying time to kill people in a fully-operational jet on a visual approach in clear weather. And there's no excuse for an airline to allow the proficiency of their crews to degrade to that point. None.

 

Regards

If the PAPI lights were operational, then surely the pilots should have known that they were way too low ages before the actual touchdown? Why did they not correct for this when they still had time?

 

They weren't too low ages before touchdown: They were above their theoretical glide path and that's why they were going down steeply. That's why the throttles went back to idle and stayed there while the 777 increased its vertical speed down to 600 ft AGL.

 

Tragedy began only really late when really low already and the throttles would not wake up automatically.

If that's the case you're doing something wrong, something very wrong. This notion that visual approaches challenging is baffling to me, I'm very taken aback by it.

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

I'm taken aback that you don't realize there are threats residing within that evolution.  Southwest at Burbank, FedEx at Tallahasee, they've all lost aircraft on easy visual approaches.  One too high, one too low.  Often the setups are less than ideal because ATC can clear you for one from wherever you are, instead of having to meet stricter guidlines of your positioning before clearing you for an instrument approach.  You should talk to your training department about it.

They weren't too low ages before touchdown: They were above their theoretical glide path and that's why they were going down steeply. That's why the throttles went back to idle and stayed there while the 777 increased its vertical speed down to 600 ft AGL.

Where did that information come from? The amateur video that CNN got hold of yesterday does not show the aircraft early enough to determine that.

If the PAPI lights were operational, then surely the pilots should have known that they were way too low ages before the actual touchdown? Why did they not correct for this when they still had time?

There was no ILS since there was construction going on and maybe no PAPI either. But if there was at least a PAPI or even just recognized the low sight picture, yes they would have known they were going low. And like a well trained airline pilot, he would have just pulled back on the stick to get back up on the glideslope. And if he didn't realize that the A/T wasn't adding power while he really wanted to go higher, all that would have resulted in was just a steady bleeding down of airspeed.