The engines didn't have fuel starvation. Eyewitnesses have stated they heard the engines rev up.

 

Thus I am ruling out an aircraft malfunction.

 

I would choose to speculate that the pilots were not focused as they had let the aircraft get below the glide slope (obviously). Judging from initial first hand information there was no talk of any problems until 7 seconds before crashing.

 

Korean airlines from my personal experience with the Korean culture and the history of the previous crashes of Korean Airlines Aircraft shows that it is very difficult for Koreans to break through the respect barrier and correct each other. This goes especially for older pilots who are not known for their meekness in the cockpit. This does draw parallels with the KLM Canary Islands disaster.

Just read the pilot, Lee Kang-kook was on his first approach in command of the 777 but had flown many times to KSFO in the 747 and had previously held other ratings. He was not an inexperienced pilot

Thanks for rebalancing before the lynch mob get carried away. Lets wait for the NTSB findings because history has constantly proven that it is usualy a combination of factors. Turn off all the CNN and Fox rubbish and wait for the REAL experts to ascertain the true facts.

 

Sent from my GT-N7100 using Tapatalk 4 Beta

 

 

The best conjecture (still no more than that!) so far:

 

http://flyingprofessors.net/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-2/

The engines didn't have fuel starvation. Eyewitnesses have stated they heard the engines rev up.

 

Thus I am ruling out an aircraft malfunction.

 

I would choose to speculate that the pilots were not focused as they had let the aircraft get below the glide slope (obviously). Judging from initial first hand information there was no talk of any problems until 7 seconds before crashing.

 

Korean airlines from my personal experience with the Korean culture and the history of the previous crashes of Korean Airlines Aircraft shows that it is very difficult for Koreans to break through the respect barrier and correct each other. This goes especially for older pilots who are not known for their meekness in the cockpit. This does draw parallels with the KLM Canary Islands disaster.

Apparently there was no glide slope as it was switched off!!! Modern pilots get so used to the on board computers handling everything except the tea that when something happens they are out of the loop and by the time they respond it's too late to recover. Ithink the manufacturers should learn from the old days and perhaps design ap's to have manual throttle again!

And another good site:

 

http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/professional-pilots-on-the-san-francisco-crash/277563/

 

Three quotes from that site:

 

 

1. Another possible trap for pilots when using FLCH:

 

"The 777 has autothrottle wake up, ie when the aircraft approaches a stall the power comes on automatically to almost full power. This gives pilots great confidence however autothrottle wake up is inhibited in FLCH."

 

2. "For what it's worth - I am of the opinion that slam dunk approaches for "Heavy" jets like the B777 these have no place at a major international airports.

 

In a "heavy" jet it's always (in my experience) a challenge to "get down & slow down" and become stabilised on this particular approach at SFO - something that sometimes ATC fail to appreciate.

 

Throw into the mix this runway allegedly not having any functioning ILS or even visual vertical reference guidance system - then it all adds to the possibility of "an accident waiting to happen."

 

 

 

3. "SFO and their notorious ATC instructed 'slam dunk' visual approaches [in which the planes are kept high, then ordered to descend quickly before landing] from downwind have resulted in so many incidents at our airline that it is a regular item in recurent simulator training. 
 

 

Throw in the lack of visual or electronic glideslope guidance and the holes are lined up. True, you can set up an LNAV/VNAV profile but this requires a bit of heads down time in the box at a busy phase, not easy unless you are expecting the manouvre."

Apparently there was no glide slope as it was switched off!!! Modern pilots get so used to the on board computers handling everything except the tea that when something happens they are out of the loop and by the time they respond it's too late to recover. Ithink the manufacturers should learn from the old days and perhaps design ap's to have manual throttle again!

 

 

Modern pilots land manually more than 90% of the time ...

Yes airline pilots 'Land' manually 90% of the time however I would say 90% disconnect the automatics at 500ft after being stable on the automatics for the whole approach. Not to mention a heavy jet/longhaul crew may get 2/3 landings a month.

 

It is important to remember that unlike most other Boeings the auto throttle on the 777 is told to be left on during manual flight, why anyone would select FLCH at low altitude and not monitor what A/T mode is on the FMA + allow the speed to decay is beyond me.

 

Especially if the pilot flying is being monitored on a check ride.

Yes airline pilots 'Land' manually 90% of the time however I would say 90% disconnect the automatics at 500ft after being stable on the automatics for the whole approach. Not to mention a heavy jet/longhaul crew may get 2/3 landings a month.

 

It is important to remember that unlike most other Boeings the auto throttle on the 777 is told to be left on during manual flight, why anyone would select FLCH at low altitude and not monitor what A/T mode is on the FMA + allow the speed to decay is beyond me.

 

Especially if the pilot flying is being monitored on a check ride.

 

 

 

Still most questions are unanswered ...

 

Regarding the flight path/energy path in the 'flyingprofessors' link, it doesn't look like a FLCH - so I'm still wondering where the automatic stall protection of the B777 was? Not the slightest hint for a beginning engine spool-up (probably it would have been too late anyway, regarding spool-up time, aircraft momentum, descent rate and altitude).

 

It's really a tough setting:

 

- PF new on the type

- PF "re-born copilot" (former 747 pilot)

- end of a 10 hour flight at a CRZ FL in the area of FL400 (oxygen level?)

- ATC wants your heavy to perform a "slam-dunk" approach

- no G/S to back up your descent and approach

 

There's a likelihood for pilots' mistakes - but lots of possible contributing factors, existing before the crash and widely accepted, narrowing safety margins ...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Orw3rbj5MI

 

A video of the crash, it's a bit far away.

Video has already been posted... Oliver, do you have a link to the flight/energy path? I would be interested to see what altitude the crew selected on the MCP, if the target altitude was below the aircraft and the AFDS mode was FLCH the engines would have sat at idle until the aircraft stalled. What should have been set in the MCP was the missed approach altitude.

 

Will be interesting reading the final report.

Media starting to drop this already. Not enough deaths for them to keep it on the front pages

Video has already been posted... Oliver, do you have a link to the flight/energy path? I would be interested to see what altitude the crew selected on the MCP, if the target altitude was below the aircraft and the AFDS mode was FLCH the engines would have sat at idle until the aircraft stalled. What should have been set in the MCP was the missed approach altitude.

 

Will be interesting reading the final report.

 

 

This is the link I was referring to:

 

http://flyingprofessors.net/what-happened-to-asiana-airlines-flight-214-2/

 

I'm not aware of any published FDR data, though, except for the narrative from the 2nd NTSB update.

I can understand that was a long flight and ATC contribution(still, he could refuse "slam-dunk" approach BTW)...
But some things cannot be overlooked and forgiven - he was not in stabilized approach at 1000, not in stabilized approach at 500, and not in stabilized approach at minimums! Then, at landing, after copilot warned him about low speed(7seconds before impact acording to NTBS), there was no room for waithing, thinking, assessing situation etc. It's only one posible response - TOGA! There was no immediate response at copilot warning(7 seconds before impact) and stick shaker(4seconds before impact)!
Acording to NTBS throttle was advanced just a few seconds before impact... You can try this if you want when you're alone in your cesnna, but not when you are responsible for 300 lives

 

Oh No! First for a 777...

No, It's happened at Heathrow also.

No, It's happened at Heathrow also.

 

Yes, but this is the first deadly crash (after more then 5 millions flights) for 777