Was not sure if this would ever see the light of day. Sadly another preventable crash, apart from the fact that CRM was non existent, & they proceeded below MDA on a non precision approach, it also looks like they became yet another victim of somatogravic illusion.

 

I lost a good friend on the A320 out here in the gulf because the captain applied full nose down sidestick whilst flying a missed approach in pitch black conditions, the F/O said nothing right up until impact.

 

Makes me wonder how much emphasis is placed on this with some airlines training depts, it is something that cannot be demonstrated in the sim however it is an extremely dangerous illusion.

 

Regards

 

http://caa.ly/finalReport/FINAL_5A-ONG-1.pdf

Interesting.. I had no idea what somatogravic illusion was until now. What a scary thing...

 

"In aviation we are faced with the combination of rapid acceleration and reduced/no visual cues (i.e. IMC and/or night flying). As we no longer have the benefit of our visual system to resolve the ambiguity, our brain uses the signals it is receiving and interprets them as a ‘tilt’. The net result is a tilt back (i.e. pitching up) sensation under acceleration, and a tilting forward (i.e. pitching down) sensation under deceleration (Wilson, 1995 8).

 

Typically this occurs during the missed approach or go-around segment of a flight at night or in IMC. Speed is slow, power is rapidly applied and the aircraft then accelerates rapidly (U.S. Navy, n.d. 7). As no visual cues exist, this generates a strong ‘tilt back’ sensation which the pilot interprets (incorrectly) as a rapid pitching up sensation. Despite this perception the aircraft may still actually be in a level attitude or only a slight climb (Tait, 2003 6). This is the somatogravic illusion. The pilot will then push forward on the control column to control this (imaginary) climb thinking they are lowering the aircraft nose back to level flight, when in actual fact they are lowering the nose into a dive. As the aircraft nose lowers, the aircraft continues to accelerate, generating additional pitch up sensations, causing the pilot to lower the nose even further. Tragically, this illusion normal ends with the pilot commanding the aircraft into a high speed steep dive and contact with the ground quickly ensues."

Thanks for linking the report. Some interesting reading, and good to finally know what happened.

That was a very informative read. Thank you for sharing. I am going to use it the next time I need to give a brief on Spatial Disorientation as well as crew coordination.

Just finished reading the report, I'm shocked, the flight deck seems a mess, no CRM, no situational awareness, lack of adherence to checklist, no-cross checking, the relief FO not making a peep while watching this whole thing unveil before his eyes, the Captain not taking over and performing the escape manouver when the terrain alarm went off, where do I stop?

 

Far more to this accident than just the somatogravic effect.

 

 

On an unrelated note though, odd that they tanker fuel for the round trip from TIP to JNB and back, fuel must be cheap in Libya...

 

Regards,

Ró.

It was a complete mess, the crew also botched the approach to the same runway on a previous flight. They went missed and landed on 27 with the ILS

 

At worse this should have been a lesson on poor CRM and busting minimums, that nose down input turned it into a disaster for everyone onboard.

Yeh I read that, though I think in this case I read that the ILS was out on the day of the accident.

 

Also worrying that the Alitalia took off with little fire cover...

 

Regards,

Ró.

I did find it odd that a pilot with over 17,000 hours made the mistakes that he did. Sounds like overcomplacency as well. Sounds like it was just all messed up.

fuel must be cheap in Libya...

 

In those Gaddafi days it was plentiful.

Yeh I read that, though I think in this case I read that the ILS was out on the day of the accident.

 

Also worrying that the Alitalia took off with little fire cover...

 

I was thinking it would be a little unnerving to see an aircraft go in (watching the tail bounce around and such) and then have to take off a couple minutes later.

 

scott s.

.

I did find it odd that a pilot with over 17,000 hours made the mistakes that he did. Sounds like overcomplacency as well. Sounds like it was just all messed up.

I think they say it takes 10,000 hours to become an expert, but the Captain in question only had 500 on type... Besides, even those of us with 17k hours aren't immune to mistakes, the hours count for nothing if you spend them doing it wrong. 5 hours spent doing something correctly is better than 100 doing it wrong.

 

 

I was thinking it would be a little unnerving to see an aircraft go in (watching the tail bounce around and such) and then have to take off a couple minutes later.

Yeh, I'm not sure why they weren't held so statements could be taken. Seems odd to me... Don't think I'd be comfortable flying after witnessing such a violent crash...

 

Regards,

Ró.

Page 57 of the report, this same crew landed 14 days earlier in the same aircraft, approached the same runway...never stabilised, enormous pitch angles, dual inputs, exceeded VFE, sorry to say, but this crew was indeed an accident waiting to happen.

I think they say it takes 10,000 hours to become an expert, but the Captain in question only had 500 on type... Besides, even those of us with 17k hours aren't immune to mistakes, the hours count for nothing if you spend them doing it wrong. 5 hours spent doing something correctly is better than 100 doing it wrong.

 

10,000 hours is a lot, or at least seems like a lot. With us in the military, 3,000 seems like a ton. Clearly makes sense that airline pilots would accumulate a ton more though. Its all about perspective i suppose.

Thanks for the link. Another (preventable) tragic accident. It is so sad when accidents are caused by such basic errors, but the actions of the pilots would be partially understandable had such illusions occurred. However, as others have mentioned, the fact that this was a repeat of a recent similar incident indicates that the crew was somewhat weak.

 

the hours count for nothing if you spend them doing it wrong. 5 hours spent doing something correctly is better than 100 doing it wrong.

Well said. I agree.

10,000 hours is a lot, or at least seems like a lot.

Depending on the airline that's around 13-14 years of experience, As Captains go, most of ours have been working as FO's for about 12-13 years before being promoted to Captain. So almost all our Captains would have in excess of 10,000 hours. In that regard, while it may seem like a lot, in the scheme of things, it isn't totally out there.

 

Regards,

Ró.