Bruce, have a read about the FLCH trap. basically if you are desending in FLCH with the Flight directors on & have the MCP altitude below your target altitude, the throttles will remain at idle. You will also have have no speed (wake up) protection once you are below 100ft agl

 

This I do not get. Did he fly the visual approach with AP on and AT on in FLCH (MCP altitude below target)? If so, it is  so wrong!

Correct procedure would be AP off with AT on (controlling speed), MCP altitude re-set for GA one.

Managing speed is one of the most important factors in such approach and as Ronan mentioned, if one of the pilots had called "go-around", the PF just had to click TOGA without any questions asked.

 

 

We as pilots are paid to be able to fly planes, not to look at them and intervene if something goes askew.

 

Very well said.

This I do not get. Did he fly the visual approach with AP on and AT on in FLCH (MCP altitude below target)? If so, it is  so wrong!

Correct procedure would be AP off with AT on (controlling speed), MCP altitude re-set for GA one.

Managing speed is one of the most important factors in such approach and as Ronan mentioned, if one of the pilots had called "go-around", the PF just had to click TOGA without any questions asked.

 

 

Chances are FLCH was the last mode active before the A/P was switched off (A/T still on) for manual flying.

 

If my understanding is correct: Now A/T is on but former FLCH mode inhibits the throttle wake-up and prevents automatic stall protection.

Thanks. That's interesting. Again, they would have to be completely out of the loop to let speed decay to the extent that it did in this case. But this issue could speak to transition training at Asiana and how pitfalls like this were not flagged to pilots.

By the way, you're not the same Rob Prest who wrote F4 Phantom. If not, I recommend it. Great book.

 

Haha, No my dad wrote it, think I was about 6 at the time! Must have read it about 10 times during my adult life He is a skipper on the 777 now (still dreaming of the F4) Glad you enjoyed it.

Chances are FLCH was the last mode active before the A/P was switched off (A/T still on) for manual flying.

 

If my understanding is correct: Now A/T is on but former FLCH mode inhibits the throttle wake-up and prevents automatic stall protection.

 

OK, they were still in FLCH mode (AP off), which inhibits throttle wake-up and AT did not therefore keep Vref + 5. Because no other mode (ILS inop) kicked in, they successfully stalled the plane.

 

Important lesson to be learned - know your technology before you are about to take 300 people airborne!

Haha, No my dad wrote it, think I was about 6 at the time! Must have read it about 10 times during my adult life He is a skipper on the 777 now (still dreaming of the F4) Glad you enjoyed it.

 

Hmmm, I usually never waste a chance to read a good aviation book. Just placed my order with amaz...ing bookstore.

 

Bruno 

Now fellas, you keep running away with this FLCH trap discussion, however it was previously stated that both the AP as well as the AT were turned OFF 45 seconds prior to the incident, regardless of the Boeing reccomendation of leaving AT on through the flare.

Just an FYI, in any airline worth it's salt, both pilots at all stages in the approach are allowed to call out "go-around" and the Pilot Flying must go-around first, ask questions later.

 

Regards,

Ró.

Totally agree!  There should never be a pilot in the cockpit that is afraid to speak up if something doesn't look, feel or sound right...at any stage of flight, but especially during those crucial stages like takeoff and landing.

 

 

There will be no good outcome when the real reason for this accident is revealed.... poor airmenship, CRM, crewmembers neglecting to speak up.....They are all inexcusable reasons for loss of life and airframe. 

 

I like this captain briefing to his FO I read somewhere....."Its my job to not kill anybody today, its your job to make sure I do my job!"

OK, they were still in FLCH mode (AP off), which inhibits throttle wake-up and AT did not therefore keep Vref + 5. Because no other mode (ILS inop) kicked in, they successfully stalled the plane.

 

Important lesson to be learned - know your technology before you are about to take 300 people airborne!

 

 

Chances are FLCH was the last mode active before the A/P was switched off (A/T still on) for manual flying.

 

If my understanding is correct: Now A/T is on but former FLCH mode inhibits the throttle wake-up and prevents automatic stall protection.

 

 

Am I correct at all?

 

And IF I'm correct: What's this design good for? I can't really see any advantages in designing it that way.

And if it's a real trap (as named by RW 777 pilots): Why hasn't it been changed in some fancy software versions?

 

(This does not take away anything from the pilots' primary responsibility.)

Now fellas, you keep running away with this FLCH trap discussion, however it was previously stated that both the AP as well as the AT were turned OFF 45 seconds prior to the incident, regardless of the Boeing reccomendation of leaving AT on through the flare.

 

 

Wake-up mode is also possible with A/T only armed.

Now fellas, you keep running away with this FLCH trap discussion, however it was previously stated that both the AP as well as the AT were turned OFF 45 seconds prior to the incident, regardless of the Boeing reccomendation of leaving AT on through the flare.

where have you heard about autothrottle? I saw NTBS statement that autopilot was turned off, but nothing about autothrottle so far.

 

And +1 for autothrottle just armed

where have you heard about autothrottle? I saw NTBS statement that autopilot was turned off, but nothing about autothrottle so far.

Earlier in this thread:

I heard on this mornings news that the crew turned off the autopilot and autothrottle systems ~45 seconds prior to the crash.

 

I assumed it was from a NTSB report based on the FDR given that the specific time of disconnect was listed.

 

Done anyone know for sure the status of automation as reported by the FDR to confirm?

If you look at Airbus it has plenty of traps for the unwary, they call it Airbus gotchas. I always though the FLCH trap was pretty well known, I even remember discussing it on the PMDG forums 5 or more years ago. FLCH has never been a good idea at low altitude.

 

Regarding A/T as far as I am aware the NTSB has not stated it was switched off, only the AP at 1600ft. If it was switched off it is against Boeing SOP, all 777 operators I know off want the A/T in on approach.

 

If they did switch it off then that's another issue for the NTSB to look at.

Earlier in this thread:

 

I assumed it was from a NTSB report based on the FDR given that the specific time of disconnect was listed.

 

Done anyone know for sure the status of automation as reported by the FDR to confirm?

 

 

Not exactly but the best source I have to offer: http://avherald.com/h?article=464ef64f&opt=0

 

"The autopilot was disconnected at 1600 feet 82 seconds prior to impact, (...)" ... but no mentioning of switching off the A/T.

 

 

Haha, No my dad wrote it, think I was about 6 at the time! Must have read it about 10 times during my adult life He is a skipper on the 777 now (still dreaming of the F4) Glad you enjoyed it.

 

Hey, that's great to hear. My copy is well-thumbed and has a place of pride on the shelf next to Gann and Bach. I usually read it once a year. Pass on my compliments to your Dad for a well-written book and tell him I've been eagerly waiting for the sequel. 

Hey, that's great to hear. My copy is well-thumbed and has a place of pride on the shelf next to Gann and Bach. I usually read it once a year. Pass on my compliments to your Dad for a well-written book and tell him I've been eagerly waiting for the sequel.

 

Cheers, will do. Sadly he has one year left to retirement, I am sure he will get back to writing & put the extra time to good use!

 

Regards