New report out.  Says pilots claim they were distracted and confused by the bright lights and beacon at the nearer airport, and the similar runway heading..  Also say they had programmed the approach into the FMC but went for the visual when the field was in sight. Reported field in sight to ATC.   PIC's first flight into Branson.  Copilot had only one other flight to Branson, in daylight.

I remember doing my night cross country coming back from Topeka to Kansas City Downtown.  Talking to MKC they asked me to report the field.  The lights of the city were so bright I couldn't see the airport or any of its lights until I was right on top of it.  I knew exactly where it was, but couldn't see it.  It was kind of scary actually.  Even though I knew exactly where I was, I made a blind mid field downwind.  After that I could see it.

 

If I had a multifunction display, I could have backed myself up a bit.  I felt like I should have been IFR on a clear night...lol.  Thankfully The old Fairfax airport hadn't been in use for some 30 years...lol..or I might have ended up landing there myself. 

 

How does this relate to the SWA flight.  Who knows, but if you have the technology, use it, you never know when it might come in handy.

Kansas City Downtown

 

Ah!  The old Municipal.  Also known as the "soup bowl".  My first experience in an airplane was from that airport to Miami in a TWA Super Constellation in the early '60's.  I flew into Fairfax twice on cross country flights back in the early '70s when I lived in Jeff City, Missouri.

Sorry, I'm really not trying to be nitpicky. Again, these are a few assumptions.

- Columbus App can set them up on the ILS but probably more often a visual unless weather requires an ILS.

- "should still have been on Springfield's screen" possible but not for sure. Again, radar coverage in the hilly terrain. Looking at the flightaware data (which is the FAA radar data just time delayed) the radar target drops off a few miles northeast of Hollister.

- Would it be at all uncommon for the a/c to be switched over to the tower 10-20nm out on a base leg? Probably not.

 

The rest I cant even comment on as it's all unknown to us at this point. There are just too many variables to speculate with, I'm not even going to try and start. Just wait and see what the actual facts are when the FAA releases a report on it.

What are you missing here? This is not 1975 were you have to tune in the ILS for an approach or else full visuals. You plug the cleared runway into the FMC and cross check your visual approach to what's on the ND screen. There's no excuse here outside of pilots in a rush to land. The FMC/ND screen information could have saved Comair from taking off on the wrong runway. Go load up your iFly/PMDG bird and try it. Accidents like this make no since period... You not only rely on ATC, visuals, but also what your on board computers are telling you. This was learned from a Russian mid-air crash over Europe that TCAS instructions override what ATC tells you. When I fly my virtual 737 I always plug in the cleared runway for cross reference.

 

It's seems like with all the modern tools available in the cockpit pilots opt for seat of the pants flying to get more traditional stick time in. From this stupid mistakes happen.

 

 

What are you missing here?

 

 I'm not missing any of it. People here make too many assumptions based on how they think things happen in the real world operation. I'm not trying to justify why this aircrew did what they did in any way. What I'm saying and have said since the beginning of this thread is to wait and see what the report says.

 I'm not missing any of it. People here make too many assumptions based on how they think things happen in the real world operation. I'm not trying to justify why this aircrew did what they did in any way. What I'm saying and have said since the beginning of this thread is to wait and see what the report says.

 

I'll admit that some people jump to conclusions quickly without details, but this situation was very obvious. When i first heard about it, I knew right away what happened. I myself use a probability method. I look at most probable causes, then rule out what I can based on available info. For example, if a plane over runs a runway, most probable causes to me would be too fast, too high, late touch down, mechanical failure and poor braking conditions. Most common factors are being fast, high, and late touch down. Those factors happen alot. Mechanical failures are basically rare, but these type of failures are usually known prior to landing giving the oppurtunity to plan accordingly. Poor braking conditions happen on occasion, but again they are usually known prior to landing giving the oppurtunity to adjust data with performance review. Landing at the wrong airport is almost certainly due to crew error. There are just too many cross checks available to prevent this. You are more likely to land on the wrong runway than the wrong airport. During circling approaches, it's very easy to bite off on the wrong runway. The possibility increases when the runways intersect, low light and low vis conditions. On the Gulfstreams we use a direct to intercept technique by loading the approach and setting up a 5 to 10 mile intercept using vectors. This draws a line from the runway or FAF using the runway course. It also cleans up the FMS/ND by removing all other points and only displaying the approach/runway course. You can use it for any type of approach or visual unless you are doing a DME arc and want the arc displayed.

 

I'll admit that I once had a situation while landing early morning on the California coast. We were being vectored by approach for a visual. The sun was above the horizon but there was some haze requiring some eye strain to make out objects in the distance. My Co said he had the airport insight. I told him to call it if he had it. After being switched to tower, I couldn't make the runway and asked the copilot's assistance. He then stated that he had lost the airport and couldn't find it. For a moment I thought about going back to approach while a slight chill creeped up the back of my neck. I then considered myself VFR and relied on the direct to intercept to make the airport and align with the runway without issue.

 

On another occasion, I was flying the LOC to 9 circle 36R at night, right at MINS, to KMEM in the middle of the night. Don't ask why I was doing such thing. As we broke out and commenced the circle, vis was down a bit as we strained to keep 36L in sight. Mentaly, I had to constantly tell my self to count 3 runways over. 36C was so inviting but I had to resist the urge and hug the inside of a highway. It was as a odd feeling watching 36C slip by while looking for 36R. Finally 36R came into view as rain pounded the windscreen. From here it was easy peasy. It was a good reminder to save interesting approaches for daytime unless you really have too.

 

 

but this situation was very obvious. When i first heard about it, I knew right away what happened.

 

 You're totally correct but you are also out there flying in the real world and experiencing it first hand. There are many simmers who just don't realize that not everyone is vectored onto final let alone onto an ILS/GPS approach and that there isn't radar coverage to the ground.   At smaller airports, calling the field in sight and being given a visual approach then switched to Tower 15nm out or more isn't uncommon. Being radar monitored by Approach or Tower even isn't always possible due to radar limitations that here are still factually unknown. There are many variables that many people without the facts or knowledge about don't take into consideration.

At smaller airports, calling the field in sight and being given a visual approach then switched to Tower 15nm out or more isn't uncommon.

 

Not real knowledgeable about today as I have not monitored ATC since moving back to the east coast, but three or so years ago this was also not uncommon at busy airports, especially where there was a heavy load on controllers during VFR conditions.   "Cleared for the visual, turn at (or cleared to) <navpoint> , contact tower at the marker...."  That was common and may still be.  Does not mean the crew's not using automated systems.  Just what was happening in the way of clearances.

I think I have started somewhat of a firestorm here. I would like to clear the air.I did not mean to ever insinuate that the incident was at all the fault of the controller. Just that the controller had not been mentioned and I was pretty sure the controller had somewhat of a role. I got my PP ticket at KCMH flying side by side with 737's and am familiar with procedures. I also totally agree with G550 about the visual approach. When I am in my NGX I always pull up the visual on the FMC if the ILS is not available. Below is the same report that was linked on page two with a quote from it. When Branson tower tells the crew they are fifteen miles out he must have radar to do that. At night even with perfect visibility (unless your airport is the only light source around) it is tough to see that fifteen miles. When the crew came straight back and reported field in sight (and fell off radar) a seasoned controller at that airport should have picked up on an issue. Now that does not take responsibility away from the crew but you can rest assured the FAA is talking to the controller as well.http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ntsb-pilots-confused-by-wrong-airports-lights/2014/01/17/1704ac18-7fd4-11e3-97d3-b9925ce2c57b_story.html?tid=auto_complete

Quote.During the landing approach, the pilots contacted the Branson control tower. They were told by controllers they were 15 miles from their target. But the pilots responded that they had the airfield in sight. Controllers then cleared the plane for a visual approach to land on Branson runway 14. That means the pilots were relying on what they could see rather than automation to orient the plane.

...that there isn't radar coverage to the ground.

Indeed not. At KGYY (Chicago/Gary International), the tower only has a monochrome DBrite* repeater display at their disposal, and that only displays traffic within six miles of their airspace between 5,000' and 500' AGL.

 

* http://www.flickr.com/photos/kurtkonrad/3046509040/

I think I have started somewhat of a firestorm here. I would like to clear the air.I did not mean to ever insinuate that the incident was at all the fault of the controller. Just that the controller had not been mentioned and I was pretty sure the controller had somewhat of a role. I got my PP ticket at KCMH flying side by side with 737's and am familiar with procedures. I also totally agree with G550 about the visual approach. When I am in my NGX I always pull up the visual on the FMC if the ILS is not available. Below is the same report that was linked on page two with a quote from it. When Branson tower tells the crew they are fifteen miles out he must have radar to do that. At night even with perfect visibility (unless your airport is the only light source around) it is tough to see that fifteen miles. When the crew came straight back and reported field in sight (and fell off radar) a seasoned controller at that airport should have picked up on an issue. Now that does not take responsibility away from the crew but you can rest assured the FAA is talking to the controller as well.http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ntsb-pilots-confused-by-wrong-airports-lights/2014/01/17/1704ac18-7fd4-11e3-97d3-b9925ce2c57b_story.html?tid=auto_complete

Quote.During the landing approach, the pilots contacted the Branson control tower. They were told by controllers they were 15 miles from their target. But the pilots responded that they had the airfield in sight. Controllers then cleared the plane for a visual approach to land on Branson runway 14. That means the pilots were relying on what they could see rather than automation to orient the plane.

You're confusing the approach controller with the local controller. The approach controller has the radar and clears the aircraft for an approach. The local controller, in the tower cab, clears the aircraft for takeoff or landing. His main concern is the picture out the window to see whether or not the runway is clear. He may or may not have a radar display for fyi purposes. When approach control has cleared the plane for approach and handed it off to the tower, he is done with them. Next. The tower controller should only be expected to express concern if the aircraft he cleared to land doesn't appear in a few minutes and land. By then it's too late to warn someone that they are landing at the wrong airport anyways.

You're confusing the approach controller with the local controller. The approach controller has the radar and clears the aircraft for an approach. The local controller, in the tower cab, clears the aircraft for takeoff or landing. His main concern is the picture out the window to see whether or not the runway is clear. He may or may not have a radar display for fyi purposes. When approach control has cleared the plane for approach and handed it off to the tower, he is done with them. Next. The tower controller should only be expected to express concern if the aircraft he cleared to land doesn't appear in a few minutes and land. By then it's too late to warn someone that they are landing at the wrong airport anyways.

 

Kevin: In the RW this is how it works.

 

 

Approach control sets up the AC pretty close to final (not 5 miles out) they will then tell the crew to contact tower on ***.**. The crew will then contact tower and may or may not get clearance at that time to land. Or they may be told of other traffic and the tower will contact them again when the traffic has cleared. This has nothing to do with whether or not the tower has radar. If you go back to the quote you will notice that the tower told the SW crew that they were 15 miles out. The only way he could have done that is with radar contacting the SW transponder. He could not do that by line of site. He may or may not have been able to see the AC depending on conditions. It is a lot easier to see the plane from the ground at 15 miles than it is to pick out the field in a sea of lights from the sky at 15 miles.

Lol. Quote from a newspaper on an aviation matter. Surely you jest. Do you really think a newspaper writer knows the difference between a 'tower' and 'approach'? I'll also tell you how it works in the 'RW'. In the real world, when I have to explain something to the people behind my flightdeck door, anything that has to do with ATC is from the 'tower'. Whether it is a delay or a matter regarding the tower, approach or center, we call it 'ATC' or 'Tower' because we need to explain things in terms that your grandmother can understand. So your take that there must be radar in the tower cab is based on a newspaper article written by a layperson for laypeople using layterms.

 

Normally when we are cleared for a visual approach, the conversation with the -Approach- controller will go something like this.

 

Approach - "Sexy 123, Branson at your ten oh clock, one five miles, report it in sight."

Me - "Sexy 123 has the field in sight."

Approach - "Sexy 123 cleared for the visual, runway three two, contact tower one two eight point one fife,"

Me - "Over to tower, goodnight."

 

The fact that somebody mentioned the words "15 miles" and "tower" in a newspaper article does not necessarily mean the tower must have a radar repeater. The word fifteen was most likely recorded on the approach frequency, which a non-aviation newspaper journalist would hold no distinction with local control, aka 'tower'.

First of all thank God nobody was hurt. Second of all it's important for us to wait until the NTSB finish their report. Third of all FAR 121 regulations require that a visual approach be backed up by a navigation aid, be it an ILS, LOC, VOR, something. I don't care how many times I have flown into a particular airport, I always back it up. Not only with the FMC but by toning the frequency and IDing it. It's the basics that keep you alive in this business. I'm not saying the crew was complacent but if they would've backed this visual with the ils this would've never happened. It makes me sad because now fellow pilots endangered the lives of innocent passengers by not following a very basic procedure.

I think it would be safe to say, even at this point, complacency was involved. This is the kind of stuff that happens to us when we look at one thing, believe that it means something, and then not verify whether that idea is true or false against something else.