Bickering over what the crew "felt" is irrelevant, as history has shown that most instrument pilots that focus on what they feel end up flying into something stationary. The crash was the result of the crews failure to recognize that they were dealing with degraded instruments and degraded fly-by-wire, reasonably basic instrument flight concepts. Had they realized this, and had they used more proper CRM they probably would have flown out of it.

This happened with two 757's, Boeing has their experiences with this type of accident.

Firstly I take umbrage at being accused of "rambling."

Secondly in my mind I am pretty certain that the pax were in fact in fear of their lives. Even heavy turbulance causes many pax to freak out. Sadly for them they had an incompetent crew up front.

Thirdly with the a/c in the stall wind noise would have been much reduced so the engine noise would be more prevalent and similar to that heard on the ground and during take-off. That for any seasoned passenger would be very unusual. And I'm pretty certain they would have a. noticed that and b. noticed the initiation of the sink with the engines still going flat out. Again a seasoned traveller would be worried I'm sure.

We don't know for sure but if there was any light on the wings from the a/c somebody would have noticed, due to the enormous sink rate, the passing cloud going in the "wrong" direction!!"

vololiberista

 

But as FLEX says unless that sink rate changes significantly then the passengers are going to feel will be limited to pressure and attitude and roll changes, which probably are going to feel like turbulence. I can't see how a seasoned traveller is going to tell that they're descending through cloud at a high rate whilst still moving forward as well if those in the cockpit are struggling massively with spatial disorientation. As you say we don't even know if any of the wing lighting was on and that would be the only way of telling which way the clouds were going (and we don't know how much cloud they passed through). Looking at the data the acceleration was at around 1g for most of the time, which is normal for severe turbulence yes? This is a genuine question.

 

To conclude simply that they were an 'incompetent crew' is a bit too easy, and does little for the development of safety. We have to try to (as I've mentioned in other posts) see what stimulus they were subjected to, how they reacted to them, and more importantly why they reacted that way to go forward from here. I believe that there are many factors that contributed to this crash which cumulatively caused confusion in the cockpit:

• Spatial disorientation.
  
• Distrust of the IAS, causing distrust in other instrument readings (very possibly the HSI) because of lack of other information such as being able to look out of the window and orient oneself.
  
• Inconsistent stall warnings that were sounding when the nose was down and stopping when the nose was up.
  
• Lack of training from AF for unreliable IAS recovery.
  

Along with a whole host of other things.

Stick pusher will not activate during a tail stall. The recovery method for a tail stall does not require realization of a tail stall. The actions for a tail stall recovery are the same as that of pulling out of a dive.

 

Stick pusher activates when the AoA is increased over the AoA that caused the stall alarm to activate. It does not know the difference between a tail and airfoil stall. The Dash-8 is not FBW. It is a conventional setup of pulleys and cables. And just a FYI, a stall (especially a tail stall) can happen at any speed.

Are you aware that in a tail stall, main wings are not stalled?

Are you aware that in a tail stall, main wings are not stalled?

 

Are you aware you're preaching to the choir?

Are you aware you're preaching to the choir?

 

I guess the actual answer was "No" then?

They were actually in "alternate law" after the AP dropped out. So they the crew were flying the a/c not the computer.

 

That was my point. Notice how I referenced normal law, not alternate.

Stick pusher activates when the AoA is increased over the AoA that caused the stall alarm to activate. It does not know the difference between a tail and airfoil stall. The Dash-8 is not FBW. It is a conventional setup of pulleys and cables. And just a FYI, a stall (especially a tail stall) can happen at any speed.

 

Do you know that a few of us on here are airline pilots and one of us is rated in the Dash (maybe more)? The facts of this crash are beat into our heads ad nauseum? Unfortunately nearly every point you make is incorrect. Research what really happened in the accident and avoid pulling your own argument into a misinformed CFIT.

CFIT.

Please forgive me for asking, but what exactly is a CFIT which I have seen mentioned here a few times? I sincerely hope it is not see-fit, i.e.see-fit to make beef up a point, etc

Controlled Flight Into Terrain

Do you know that a few of us on here are airline pilots and one of us is rated in the Dash (maybe more)? The facts of this crash are beat into our heads ad nauseum? Unfortunately nearly every point you make is incorrect. Research what really happened in the accident and avoid pulling your own argument into a misinformed CFIT.

 

The points made about both accidents were points AFTER the stall. My points are BEFORE the stall. For the umpti-billionth time, I don't care what counter measures the crew used. I'm more interested in what caused the stall.

 

I am not a pilot or a expert, nor am I portraying to be one. Do yourself a favor and re-read my statements. If I'm wrong then simply sorrect me and move on. There is no need to throw ratings into the mix. That makes me think less of you.

For Colgan the pilots caused the stall of a perfectly good airplane

 

For Air France they got erroneous readings and then caused the aircraft to stall.

Along with 447 and Colgan are airline pilots briefed on Bergenair 301 and Aero Peru 601?

Not directly but we have procedures and sim time on pitot-static problems.