Both crew members bodies were found on the ground, about 100 yards from the cockpit section.

One of the crew, I'm not sure if the captain or FO, was a woman. I believe from Lynchburg, TN.

Just a couple of things that I've heard recently.

Were they not strapped in?

Very sad

Both crew members bodies were found on the ground, about 100 yards from the cockpit section.

One of the crew, I'm not sure if the captain or FO, was a woman. I believe from Lynchburg, TN.

Just a couple of things that I've heard recently.

Just read a quote from the mayor that said the deceased pilots were still in the cockpit and would remain there until NTSB arrived. Not sure how the rumor they were found 100 yards from the a/c started, especially since it appears the cockpit windows were not broken out.

 

Either way its sad they didnt survive.

So many arm chair experts and so much professional 'speculation'. Two professional pilots perished in a terrible incident. Why is there a need  to start pretending to understand the cause or responsibility before the true details are established? WOW! They were not strapped in! PLEASE! EMS experience, . . . .  remains no where near the vehicle. I guess the seat and occupant never leave the site of the initial impact? I guess those speculators would never believe the things I have seen first hand. I suppose since a female was mentioned and they weren't in the cockpit when found dead it will be implied that something 'wrong' was going on?

 

Wait for the facts folks,. . . . . you will appear a lot smarter.

http://www.flightradar24.com/2013-08-14/09:48/12x/34.21,-86.89/9

 

Might not be 'fitting' watch the crash but here is a link from flightradar24 which I found on their facebook..

 

It´s not complete because at 5400ft it kinda stops.

 

Rest in peace.

So many arm chair experts and so much professional 'speculation'. Two professional pilots perished in a terrible incident. Why is there a need  to start pretending to understand the cause or responsibility before the true details are established? WOW! They were not strapped in! PLEASE! EMS experience, . . . .  remains no where near the vehicle. I guess the seat and occupant never leave the site of the initial impact? I guess those speculators would never believe the things I have seen first hand. I suppose since a female was mentioned and they weren't in the cockpit when found dead it will be implied that something 'wrong' was going on?

 

Wait for the facts folks,. . . . . you will appear a lot smarter.

 

For those that want to stick to just the facts I can highly recommend the NTSB youtube channel.  First media briefing is here:

Were they not strapped in?

 

Its possible for seats to separate from the floor, that's how the AFR Captain in the Toronto overrun got badly injured.

http://birmingham.raycomweather.com/2013/08/the-crash-of-ups-flight-1354-a-pilot-and-meteorologist-perspective.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

What I found interesting was that the autopilot was still engaged and so was the autothrottle, according to the NTSB presser yesterday.   Here's the link to that below.

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6HwSeKOWPU&feature=c4-overview&list=UUe5dWbxxvQqDAHmyMrEF7Kw

Just read a quote from the mayor that said the deceased pilots were still in the cockpit and would remain there until NTSB arrived. Not sure how the rumor they were found 100 yards from the a/c started, especially since it appears the cockpit windows were not broken out.

 

Either way its sad they didnt survive.

 

That wasn't a rumor, it was a news report on local television (which could be wrong).  Since the nose section broke off completely, it's possible that they would have been ejected from openings other than the windows.

The female co-pilot from Lynchburg had her viewing today, I haven't heard who the pilot was.

From another board, an asrs report about that approach:

 

 

1999 NASA report on 18 approach.

 

 

The approach to runway 18 at bhm is marginally safe at best and is a setup for an accident at worst.*****

 

 

Runway 5/23 was closed from XA00Z to XK00Z. As a result, we briefed the localizer runway 18 approach. It was my first officer's leg and neither of us had flown to this runway before. We were both acutely aware of the high terrain to the north of the field and paid particular attention to that fact in our approach briefing. The only depiction of the high terrain is on the airport page.*****

 

 

The WX was clear with excellent visibility. Bhm approach cleared us for the visual but we indicated we wanted to intercept the final outside of baskin and fly the final part of the localizer 18 approach. Although not listed on the approach page, there is a PAPI on the left side of runway 18 which has been in use for about 1 yr. We calculated the appropriate vdp based on timing as well as on the ibxo DME. From the vdp it was clear to us that if the field was not in sight at the 1300 ft altitude at the ibxo 3.3 DME, it would not be possible to complete the approach safely. The PAPI was visible from the 3.3 DME and we began a 700 FPM descent when on GS.*****

 

 

The first officer and I were both bothered by the close visual proximity of the ground while on the final stages of the approach. At about 1 mi from touchdown, a car passed under us on an east/west road. It was between 100 ft and 80 ftAGL. I again verified visually that we were on the PAPI glide path and that the glide path was visually correct with the runway visual presentation. It was clear that we were correct and the radio altimeter then began to show the ground dropping away a bit.*****

 

 

We passed over the threshold at 50 ft AGL having been centered on the glide path the entire time. By use of the ft scale and the graphic presentation on the airport page, I believe the radio altimeter was accurate and that we were on or even slightly above the glide path when we had the 80-100 ft reading.*****

 

 

How high are the trees on that hill? Although the approach and landing were uneventful, the following problems are presented: 1) there is no note about the extremely close proximity to high terrain when on this approach. The mandatory airport review page does not address runway 18 or runway 36. 2) there is no PAPI depicted in commercial chart despite having been in service for about 1 yr according to the bhm tower. 3) using a 3 degree GS and an aim point 1000 ft down runway 18, the 884 ft terrain 4000 ft north of the field calculates to a ht above ground of less than 100 ft. Trees are of course not included in this calculation. 4) runway 18 slopes down to the south and complicates the landing. A 7100 ft runway means a 6100 ft area to stop in and the downslope tends to have the effect of falling away from an aircraft in the flare. Unless you fly it on to the runway fairly aggressively, the distance could be even less. 5) NOTAM 11/023 reports runway 18 is ungrooved from 1550 to 2490. NOTAM 11/024 reports runway 36 is ungrooved from 4610-5550 ft. This obviously would have an affect on stopping under most instrument conditions, ie, a wet runway.*****

 

 

I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it. If the use of runway 18 is not prohibited, then I make the following recommendations: 1) include a picture of the runway 18 and runway 36 approachs on the mandatory airport review pages. 2) include specific notes on the operations pages about the high terrain to the north giving radio altimeter readings of 80-100 ft, 1 mi north of the field. 3) restrict use of runway 18 to day VFR conditions only and require the localizer runway 18 approach be flown. 4) update the bhm page forthwith to show the PAPI for runway 18.*****

 

 

To be blunt, I will not fly to this runway in the WX or to a wet runway. If it is the only runway open in those conditions I will divert.*****

 

 

Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that he has followed up with company, and they have issued a prohibition against using runways 18/36 except during day VFR conditions. He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway. The GPWS indication did not show any red during the approach, but varied from green to amber. The first officer was flying the approach and the captain monitored the descent. He said that they did not exceed about 700 FPM rate throughout the final approach, and that after landing, both pilots debriefed their impressions to each other. They felt that they had taken prudent precautions, but that this approach was hazardous.

I completed a Google Earth street level survey about a week ago and was astounded at what the area of the approach presents.  I do not have MSE2 Alabama, but if I did I would try the approach to see how it looks there. 

 

Amazing that this runway has no vertical guidance approach....  with all the GPS approaches that now exist at much smaller airports with VNAV and LPV.

 

Just incredible!

In case you missed this, the NTSB released a video regarding the A300-600F UPS accident in Birmingham back in 2013.

RJ

Thank you for posting this update, sad event...... glad to see that the NTSB figured out what happened.

Thanks for the video link! Quite informative.

 

Basically, a lack of attentiveness left the approach improperly setup, and a unwise decision to continue the approach when they encountered unexpected indications that something was awry with the approach setup (such as lack of IAN vertical guidance). They should have initiated a go-around instead of forcing vertical descent to the MDA in V/S mode.

 

The lesson to pilots (in NTSB's words) is to go around if something unexpected occurs on an approach and if your approach is not stabilized. Unfortunately, a short lapse in carefulness cost a good crew their lives.